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CRIMINAL LAW
AN UNHOLY ALLIANCE: PERCEPTIONS OF
INFLUENCE IN INSURANCE FRAUD
PROSECUTIONS AND THE NEED FOR
REAL SAFEGUARDS
AVIVA ABRAMOVSKY*
This Article examines the working relationship between the insurance
industry and prosecutors in the insurancefraud prosecution context. Both
informal and legislatively mandated relationships are examined and
funding schemes reviewed. The Article argues that specializedfunding of
investigatorsand prosecutorsby industry assessment has led to perceptions
of industry influence on the impartialityof the prosecutor. The Article then
reviews the capacity of perceived influence to chill tort plaintiff lawyer
activity. The Article concludes that the potentialfor conflict exists and is
sufficient to warrant due process consideration. Additionally, the Article
offers suggestions for potentialprophylactic proceduralsafeguards in the
course of prosecuting lawyers for their representative actions in the
insurancefraud context.

* Aviva Abramovsky is an Associate Professor of Syracuse University College of Law.
This Article is dedicated to the memory of her father, Abraham Abramovsky, Professor of
Law, Fordham University. His life was an inspiration and his work a blessing. May this
Article continue his work for the advancement of the criminal law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
2
For the past three decades, most state legislatures' have enacted
criminal statutes specifically targeted at deterring insurance fraud.3 Unlike
most criminal statutes, these insurance fraud laws not only delineate the
unlawful conduct sought to be deterred, but also generally restrict the scope
of potential victims to insurance carriers. 4 The expressed intent of the new

1 Not coincidentally, insurance companies are a major lobbying presence in state
capitals. See John Dunbar, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, "Big Insurance" Industry Dominates State
Legislatures, Oct. 12, 2000, http://www.publicintegrity.org/report.aspx?aid=462 (reporting
that there are 1972 insurance companies or associations that lobby state legislatures, or one
lobbying interest per every three state lawmakers). Reflecting industry interest in insurance
fraud prosecutions, industry organizations monitor the budgets, staffing, referral, and
conviction rates of the various state Insurance Fraud Bureaus. See, e.g., COALITION AGAINST
INSURANCE FRAUD, STATE INSURANCE FRAUD BUREAUS: A PROGRESS REPORT: 2001 TO 2006

(2007), availableat www.insurancefraud.org/downloads/ fraudbureaureport06.pdf.
2 Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have passed some form of criminal
insurance fraud statute. See Insurance Information Institute, Issues Update, Feb. 2008,
http://www.iii.org/mediaihottopics/insurance/fraud. All forty-eight states with particularized
insurance fraud statutes make the filing of a false claim with an insurance company a crime.
See id. Only two states-Oregon and Virginia-have not. See id. Oregon has a criminal
insurance fraud statute pending in its legislature. See H.R. 3162, 74th Sess. (Ore. 2007),
availableat www.leg.state.or.us/07reg/measpdf/hb3 I00.dir/hb3162.intro.pdf.
Those forty-eight states with various criminal insurance fraud statutes likewise have
various forms of immunity laws passed in relation to these fraud statutes which limit civil
actions otherwise likely available to policyholders for actions based on the release of their
claims information. See Insurance Information Institute, supra. The Insurance Information
Institute explains the importance of immunity laws as follows:
Privacy laws protect the rights of policyholders and claimants against the release of information
considered confidential. However, to successfully bring a case to trial, insurers must be able to

provide information to prosecutors on individuals suspected of fraud. Immunity laws that allow
insurance companies to report information without fear of criminal or civil prosecution now exist
in all states, but ... many are limited.

Id.
3 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 817.234(1) (1987), which states in pertinent part,
(1)(a) A person commits insurance fraud ... if that person, with the intent to injure, defraud or
deceive any insurer ... (2) Prepares or makes any written or oral statement that is intended to be
presented to any insurance company in connection with, or in support of, any claim for payment
or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy, knowing that such statement contains any false,
incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to such claim.., is
guilty of a felony in the third degree.
4 Some statutes define the potential victim class slightly more broadly to include the state
or local governments and self-insurance and other commercial programs.
PENAL LAW § 176.05 (Consol. 2007). Insurance fraud is defined as:

See, e.g., N.Y.

1. A fraudulent insurance act is committed by any person who, knowingly and with intent to
defraud presents, causes to be presented, or prepares with knowledge or belief that it will be
presented to or by an insurer, self insurer, or purported insurer, or purported self insurer, or any
agent thereof, any written statement as part of, or in support of, an application for the issuance
of, or the rating of a commercial insurance policy, or certificate or evidence of self insurance for
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legislation was to provide a specific vehicle for the prosecution of those
who attempted to or actually filed false, fraudulent, or exaggerated claims
with their insurance companies. 5 In addition to deterring future offenders,
legislators hoped that these statutes would result in a public benefit of
smaller insurance premiums. 6
commercial insurance or commercial self insurance, or a claim for payment or other benefit
pursuant to an insurance policy or self insurance program for commercial or personal insurance
which he knows to: (i) contain materially false information concerning any fact material thereto;
or (ii) conceal, for the purpose of misleading, information concerning any fact material thereto.
Id.
5 Efficiency in the prosecution of insurance fraud crimes is among the avowed express
interests of legislatures in enacting specific insurance fraud statutes. See, for example,
Findings, Declarations Relative to Insurance Fraud, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-4.4 (West
2008), which states:
[T]he Legislature finds and declares:
a. Insurance fraud is inimical to public safety, welfare and order within the State of New
Jersey. Insurance fraud is pervasive and expensive, costing consumers and businesses
millions of dollars in direct and indirect losses each year. Insurance fraud increases
insurance premiums, to the detriment of individual policyholders, small businesses, large
corporations and governmental entities. All New Jerseyans ultimately bear the societal
burdens and costs caused by those who commit insurance fraud.
b. The problem of insurance fraud must be confronted aggressively by facilitating the
detection, investigation and prosecution of such misconduct, as well as by reducing its
occurrence and achieving deterrence through the implementation of measures that more
precisely target specific conduct constituting insurance fraud.
c. To enable more efficient prosecution of criminally culpable persons who knowingly
commit or assist or conspire with others in committing fraud against insurance companies, it
is necessary to establish a crime of "insurance fraud" to directly and comprehensively
criminalize this type of harmful conduct, with substantial criminal penalties to punish
wrongdoers and to appropriately deter others from such illicit activity.
d. In addition to criminal penalties, in order to maintain the public trust and ensure the
integrity of professional licensees and certificate-holders who by virtue of their professions
are involved in insurance transactions, it is appropriate to provide civil remedial provisions
governing license or certificate forfeiture and suspension tailored to this new crime of
insurance fraud and other criminal insurance-related activities.
e. To enhance the State's ability to detect insurance fraud, which will lead to more
productive investigations and, ultimately, more successful criminal prosecutions, it is
appropriate to provide members of the public with significant incentives to come forward
when they may have reasonable suspicions or knowledge of a person or persons committing
insurance fraud. The establishment of an Insurance Fraud Detection Reward Program will
enable the Insurance Fraud Prosecutor to obtain information which may lead to the arrest,
prosecution and conviction of persons or entities who have committed insurance-related
fraud.
6 See id. The stakes are undoubtedly high: insurance is a multi-trillion-dollar industry.
See U.S. Securities and InsuranceIndustries: Keeping the Promise, Hearing of the House
Fin. Serv. Comm., 107th Cong. 61 (2001) (quoting a release from the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners stating that the industry "is an $850 billion industry with assets
of over $3 trillion"). To put that number in perspective, in 2002, Swiss banks were
estimated to have $2.3 trillion under management. See David G. Stebing, Insurance
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Financial fraud prosecutions are complex and frequently expensive,
with all jurisdictions dedicating substantial resources to combating white
collar crime. Unlike most other criminal prosecutions, insurance fraud
prosecutions are increasingly being brought by prosecutors funded
separately from the state's general revenues. These prosecutors' salaries
are either entirely or in large part paid by monies obtained by direct
assessments on the insurance industry. The adoption of this prosecution
Regulation in Alaska: Healthy Exercise of a State Prerogative, 10 ALASKA L. REV. 279, 281
(1993) ("Insurance companies and related service industries, including brokers, agents and
adjusters, employ nearly 2.5 million persons. The insurance industry accounts for nearly
$100 billion of the gross national product ('GNP') of the United States, with insurance
premiums alone accounting for more than seven percent of the GNP."). In addition to
handling large sums of money, the insurance industry is extremely profitable. See Peter G.
Gosselin, Insurers Saw Record Gains in Year of CatastrophicLoss, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5,
2006, at Al ("The companies that provide Americans with their homeowners and auto
insurance made a record $44.8 billion profit last year even after accounting for the claims of
policyholders wiped out by Hurricane Katrina and the other big storms of 2005, according to
the firms' filings with state regulators."). Moreover, insurance is ubiquitous. See Deborah
A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insuranceas Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 11, 26
(1999) ("The existence of insurance as a fundamental and ubiquitous aspect of both
commercial and personal life means that an organized system of help is also something
people take for granted, even if they do not think terribly hard about or even understand the
way insurance is organized.").
7 Insurance industry funding for different aspects of an insurance fraud investigation and
prosecution occurs in a variety of different ways. Many states legislatively mandate an
assessment on the insurance industry doing business in their states, using a variety of
different formulae. Likewise, the proceeds of these assessments are distributed amongst
investigators and prosecutors according to different state-specific systems. For example,
Pennsylvania assesses insurance companies based on the amount of business they conduct in
the state, and the proceeds are placed in a fund that is disbursed to prosecutors for use in
insurance fraud prosecutions. See 40 PA. STAT. ANN. § 325.23(c) (2007). The assessed
funds are kept separate from general revenue and their use is restricted to the Insurance
Fraud Prevention authority. See id. § 325.23(b). Similarly, in Nevada, insurers are assessed
in proportion to the premiums they charge in the state to support units established in the
Office of the Attorney General that investigate and prosecute persons who commit insurance
fraud. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 679B.700 (2007). The Nevada assessed funds, even if unused
at the end of the fiscal year, never become part of the state's general funds. See id. In New
Jersey, the Division of Insurance Fraud is empowered to investigate allegations of insurance
fraud and refer any possible criminal activity to the Attorney General. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:33A-1 to A-30 (2007). The cost of the Division is borne by the insurance companies
themselves based on a proportion of the premiums received by each insurance company in
the State. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:33A-8(g).
Some states seem primarily interested in regulating automobile insurance fraud.
California, for example, assesses all automobile insurance companies "doing business in that
state." See CAL. INS. CODE § 1872.8(a) (2007). Fifty-one percent of those funds are then
allocated for distribution to district attorneys for investigation and prosecution of automobile
insurance fraud cases. Id. (stating that California assesses automobile insurers up to $1.00
per insured vehicle per year). Likewise, Rhode Island has an Office of Automobile Theft
and Insurance Fraud, which investigates and prosecutes all forms of automobile insurance
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funding method allows insurance fraud prosecution programs to exhibit the
most comprehensive presence of any private industry in the enforcement of
relevant criminal laws. 8

fraud. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-50-1(b) (2007). The Office is funded by the insurance
companies that do business in the State in the amount of $1.00 per vehicle insured. Id. § 3150-4.
Private, voluntary industry groups also offer financial support as investigators and have
picked up various prosecutorial costs in specific cases. See discussion of the Informal
Alliance infra Part III.B. In quite a few states, individual companies are frequently
legislatively mandated to create and fund internal "special investigation units" to investigate
possible frauds within their companies. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 409 (McKinney 2008).
Fraud prevention plans and special investigations units:
(a) Every insurer writing private or commercial automobile insurance, workers'
compensation insurance, or individual, group or blanket accident and health insurance
policies issued or issued for delivery in this state, except for insurers that write less than three
thousand of such policies, issued or issued for delivery in this state annually, and every entity
licensed pursuant to article forty-four of the public health law except those entities with an
enrolled population of less than sixty thousand persons in the aggregate and, except those
entities licensed pursuant to sections forty-four hundred three-a, forty-four hundred three-c,
forty-four hundred-d, forty-four hundred three-f and forty-four hundred eight-a of the public
health law shall, within one hundred twenty days of the effective date of this amended
section to be promulgated by the superintendent to implement this section, file with the
superintendent a plan for the detection, investigation and prevention of fraudulent insurance
activities in this state and those fraudulent insurance activities affecting policies issued or
issued for delivery in this state. The superintendent may accept programs and processes
implemented pursuant to section forty-four hundred fourteen of the public health law as
satisfying the obligations of this section and regulations promulgated thereunder.
(b)(1) The plan shall provide the time and manner in which such plan shall be implemented,
including provisions for a full-time special investigations unit and staffing levels within such
unit. Such unit shall be separate from the underwriting or claims functions of an insurer, and
shall be responsible for investigating information on or cases of suspected fraudulent activity
and for effectively implementing fraud prevention and reduction activities pursuant to the
plan filed with the superintendent. An insurer shall include in such plan staffing levels and
allocations of resources in such full-time special investigations unit as may be necessary and
appropriate for the proper implementation of the plan and approval of such plan pursuant to
subsection (d) of this section.
(2) In lieu of a special investigations unit, an insurer may contract with a provider of services
related to the investigation of information on or cases of suspected fraudulent activities;
provided, however, that an insurer which opts for contracting with a separate provider of
services, shall provide to the superintendent a detailed plan therefor, pursuant to requirements
set forth in regulation by the superintendent.
Id.
8 Private financing of aspects of a criminal prosecution, including assisting with
investigations, has been subject to both judicial and scholarly criticism. See Joseph E.
Kennedy, Private Financing of Criminal Prosecutions and the Differing Protections of
Liberty and Equality in the CriminalJustice System, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 665, 687-707
(1997). Private financial assistance from insurance companies to assist in effectuating
insurance fraud prosecutions seems to have occurred initially on a strictly voluntary basis.
See id. at 668.

A VIVA ABRAMO VSKY

[Vol. 98

The enforcement of the criminal laws is a public trust.9 It is generally
accepted that criminal defendants are entitled to a certain amount of
neutrality and disinterestedness on the part of the prosecutor, particularly as
a part of defendant's right to a fair trial.10 The prosecutor's office is seen as
representing the people, and the office seeks justice within the confines of
governmental impartiality.11 As such, it is important to examine these new
institutionalized structures and their entwinement with private interests as
12
potential sources of risk to that notion of impartial justice.
Moreover, the consequences of even a perception of improper
influence on fraud prosecutions implicate other relevant policy
considerations. The existence of statutory schemes which offer even the
reasonable inference of injustice, such as perceptions of conflicts of
interests, may themselves have undesirable consequences.' 3 Attorneys have

9 See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249 (1980) ("Prosecutors... must serve the
public interest.").
10 For an excellent and comprehensive discussion on the positive and normative concepts
of prosecutorial neutrality, see Bruce Green & Fred Zacharias, ProsecutorialNeutrality,
2004 Wis. L. REV.837, 850-52 (2004).
11Frequently, neutrality is seen to require some sense of impartiality and sense that
justice has been done. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("The United
States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all."); Jones v. Richards, 776 F.2d 1244, 1247 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting that a
criminal defendant is entitled "to an impartial prosecutor, who can make an unbiased use of
all options available"); People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 315 (Cal. 1996) (noting that "the
nature of the impartiality required of the public prosecutor follows from the prosecutor's role
as a representative of the People as a body, rather than as individuals"); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2008) ("[A] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister ofjustice
and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to
see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice.").
Though the courts appear to recognize impermissible prosecutorial behavior when
required, they have had trouble articulating a recognizable standard for its breach. See, e.g.,
Wright v. United States, 732 F.2d 1048, 1056 (2d Cir. 1984) ("It is a bit easier to say what a
disinterested prosecutor is not than what he is. He is not disinterested if he has, or is under
the influence of others who have an axe to grind against the defendant, as distinguished from
the appropriate interest that members of society have in bringing defendants to justice with
the respect to the crime with which he is charged.").
12 In terms of Madisonian constitutionalism, all legitimacy of government is dependant
upon freedom from interested factions. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at n. 161 ("For
Madisonians, the capture of government power by private interests destroys the legitimacy
of government power.") (quoting The Federalist No. 10, at 57 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961)).
13Trial attorney organizations have recognized the likelihood that the perception of
improper influence may arise from prosecutions in these industry-funded prosecutor
situations. See infra Part III.C (discussing ATLA Brief). Moreover, such systems implicate
society's interest in equality of access to justice. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 707 ("To the
extent that these additional prosecutions are the product of preferential access to justice for
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been criminally prosecuted under these systems for actions undertaken
during civil cases adverse to insurance industry financial interests. 14 Such
prosecutions, without sufficient prophylactic safeguards, may result in
chilling the representation available to claimants and implicate issues of
zealous advocacy. 15
It is well understood that the threat of criminal prosecution is an
effective restriction on the bounds of zealousness. As Professor John C.
Coffee has recognized, between the alternatives of engaged advocacy or
self-preservation from criminal prosecution, the rational lawyer would not
likely risk his liberty in favor of his aspirational duty of zealousness.' 6 Fear
of a non-neutral or otherwise influenced prosecutor implicates issues
beyond the prosecution of any specific criminal defendant.' 7 Even the mere
appearance of influence and the concomitant perceived increased risk of
triggering an unjust prosecution have the capacity to affect the availability
and efficacy of legitimate advocacy adversely. 18

monied interests, society's interests in the equal treatment of all victims and of all defendants
suffer.").
14 See, e.g., State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1997);
see also discussion
infra Part III.D.
'5The criminal law plays an important role in the regulation of lawyers, and lawyers are
not immune from criminal prosecution. See Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Prosecution of
Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 327, 327 (1998) (noting that "[blecause lawyers as a class are
neither exempt from the reach of the criminal law nor immune from criminal prosecution,
the criminal law plays a significant role in regulating lawyers"). However, scholars have
argued that, in prosecutions of lawyers for crimes alleged to have been conducted as part of
their professional conduct, the courts "should take certain procedural steps to guard against
possible prosecutorial misuse of the criminal law and against criminalizing socially desirable
and professionally accepted lawyer conduct." Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Crimes:Beyond
the Law?, 36 VAL. U. L. REv. 73, 76 (2001). Wolfram concludes that a reasonable manner
for alleviating some of the conflict of prosecution for professional conduct could be
accomplished by "placing on the prosecution the burden of proving that the conduct of the
lawyer-defendant in every such case was insupportable as a proper exercise of the lawyer's
function." Id. at 76.
16 See John C. Coffee, Jr., ParadigmsLost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law
Models-And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1879 (1992) ("[I]f ethical
standards of bar associations and other private groups were regularly criminalized, it would
not take long before these groups began to self-insure by adopting less aspirational
standards.").
17 An unjust or unsuccessful criminal prosecution can, however, advance a victim's
interests. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 702-03 ("To the degree that the mere filing of a
criminal accusation by the government against an innocent party is enough to confer benefits
on a victim, the victim's interest in seeing the prosecution pressed can directly conflict with
society's interest in prosecuting only the guilty.").
18The cost/benefit analysis of criminal prosecution frequently fails to take into account
the cost of deterring legitimate activities. Professor John C. Coffee explained some elements
for consideration when making this calculus:
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Those familiar with the relationship between tort law and insurance 1 9
have long understood the insurance industry's financial interest in the cost
of tort recoveries 2° and the relationship of those costs to claimants' legal

representation. Plaintiffs' lawyer advocacy is strongly correlated with an
adverse effect on insurance industry financial interests.21 If lawyers are
deterred from representing clients against the insurance industry, the
implications for the tort system and clients are extensive. Moreover, as
some members of the trial bar have recognized, the actual motivation of a
prosecution is irrelevant to that prosecution's ability to chill advocacy.22 To

To be sure, some may justify pervasive use of criminal sanction based on simple cost/benefit
reasoning: the loss to those imprisoned is less than the harm thereby averted through specific and
general deterrence. Yet this analysis depends on a myopic social cost accounting. Even if the
deterrent effect gained under such a system of enforcement exceeded the penalties actually
imposed, additional costs need to be considered, including the fear and anxiety imposed on riskaverse individuals forced to live under the constant threat of draconian penalties.... Ultimately,
if we measure the success of the criminal law exclusively in terms of the number of crimes
prevented, we would wind up, in Herbert Packer's memorable phrase, "creating an environment
in which all are safe but none are free."
Coffee, supra note 16, at 1881-82.
19 Insurance industry groups have succeeded in obtaining legislative action through the
political process on other financially consequential areas of law reform, such as with their
success with "tort reform." See Thomas A. Eaton & Susette M. Talarico, Testing Two
Assumptions About Federalism and Tort Reform, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 371, 397-98 (1996)
(offering empirical evidence on insurance industry effect on legislation with a finding that,
for example, "punitive damage-cap legislation is positively associated with insurance
industry strength and the proportion of lawyers in the legislature, and negatively associated
with the proportion of Democrats in the legislature [which] suggests that state lawmakers are
responding more to the political demands of powerful interest groups than to objective
assessments of particular local problems").
20 For tort recovery purposes, there are generally two classes of defendants-those with
insufficient assets or who are otherwise judgment proof as a matter of law, and those who
are insured. See Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment Proof Society, 63 WASH & LEE L. REv.
603, 613 (2006) ("Americans are the largest consumers of liability insurance... spending
roughly 2% of GNP."); see also Kent D. Syverud, On the Demandfor Liability Insurance,
72 TEX. L. REv. 1629, 1640 n.37 (1994) ("Most individual defendants in common types of
tort litigation-including automobile accident litigation-lack significant collectible assets
other than their insurance policies.").
21 See Michael Orey, In Tough Hands at Allstate, Bus. WEEK, May 1, 2006, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_1 8/b3982072.htm.
The
article
describes a McKinsey strategic analysis of attorney effect on claims costs designed for
Allstate:
One of the key elements of McKinsey's plan was reducing the number of claimants who turn to
attorneys after an accident for help in collecting their insurance. The consultants even forecast
what the potential claims in this area would mean for Allstate stock. A 25% drop in attorneys
appearing in several categories of cases could add $1.60 to Allstate's share price.
22 See, e.g., Brief of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America Amicus Curiae, 1998
WL 35018415 at *4-5 [hereinafter ATLA Brief]; see also infra Part III.C (discussing the
brief).
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a very great extent, so long as the plaintiffs' bar perceives such prosecution
as arising from the improper influence of private interests on the actions of
a prosecutor, fear of biased prosecution could reasonably be predicted to
restrict and inhibit the trial bar's activities.2 3 In this context it might truly
be said that even the appearance of impropriety is likely sufficient to inhibit
advocacy.
This Article will explore the structure of the insurance industryprosecution alliance ("The Alliance") as it is expressed in various states.
Part II will give careful attention to how these institutionalized
arrangements increase the risk of improper private influence on public law
enforcement decision-making. Part III will explore how the Alliance
system may chill legitimate claims and particularly affect the functioning of
tort plaintiffs' lawyers in an inappropriate manner. Part IV will explore the
Alliance in terms of both a prosecutor's ethical duty of independence as
well as a potential due process threat. The final section of the Article will
suggest certain prophylactic reforms to attorney prosecutions for
professional conduct, since it is unlikely that the Alliance will be
dismantled in the near future. The Article concludes with one such
suggested procedure.
II. THE

ALLIANCE IN ACTION

The prosecution of criminal offenses requires substantial public
funding, and municipalities are often reluctant to provide sufficient taxfunded revenues.24
Historically, police departments and prosecutorial
agencies have not received adequate tax funding to combat the volume of
crime that exists in their areas of jurisdiction.
Despite a general
understanding that insurance fraud is pervasive and costly, 26 insurance fraud

23See ATLA Brief, supra note 22, at *4-5.

24See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 668 ("Taxes, the traditional means of financing
government prosecutions, are seen as politically unpopular.").
25See id. ("Prosecutors at all levels of government face budget cutbacks ....

Allowing

some sort of private financial contribution arguably helps to close the gap between supply
and demand for the prosecution of crime.").
26 Sociological research finds that the public views insurance fraud as rampant and more
prevalent than insurance company denials of valid claims. See Valerie P. Hans & Juliet Dee,
Whiplash: Who's to Blame?, 68 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1093, 1097 (2003) ("[Tlhe public
believe[s] that.., fraud among claimants is rampant. Respondents in one national poll
estimated which was likely to be more frequent, an insurance company denying a valid claim
or a person attempting to bring a fraudulent claim. Over half of the poll respondents thought
that an individual was more likely to bring a fraudulent claim.").
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cases would likely be an under-prosecuted crime without alternative
funding programs. 27
Insurance fraud is inarguably extremely costly. The losses to
insurance companies from insurance fraud have been estimated at $120
billion per year.28 The industry estimates that these fraud losses cost the
average American family $300 annually in higher insurance premiums.29
Hence, industry financing of insurance fraud bureaus is seen as a mutually
beneficial investment. For example, the "Mission Statement" of the New
Mexico Insurance Fraud Bureau remarks on the willingness of the
insurance industry to fund their program, finding the industry "very willing
to finance the bureaus, because of the potential return on investment: for
it retains
every dollar an insurance company spends in support of a bureau,
30
fraud.,
insurance
to
lost
be
otherwise
ten dollars that would
A. THE ALLIANCE'S FORMS AND FUNDING
Currently, there are three basic models by which the insurance industry
and government coordinate and integrate the investigation and prosecution
of insurance fraud. The first model, unique to Massachusetts, creates a

27

See Robert W. Emerson, Insurance Claims Fraud Problems and Remedies, 46 U.

L. REv. 907, 910 (1992) (suggesting that in the absence of career prosecutors, most
simply "lack the experience, knowledge, or interest to prosecute cases of insurance fraud
aggressively").
28 See Carrie Coolidge, Dirty Rotten Scoundrels, FORBES, Oct. 16, 2006 ("[The] National
Association of Insurance Commissioners ...guesses that insurance fraud costs $120 billion
a year in the U.S."); Peter Hull, Fraud Awareness Week Gets Its Own Expo, POST &
COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Nov. 6, 2006 ("Insurance fraud costs business and consumers
nearly $120 billion a year, including $85 billion a year for health care fraud and $30 billion a
year for property and casualty insurance fraud, according to the Insurance Information
Institute."); Suspected Insurance FraudRingleader Turns Himself In, U.S. STATES NEWS,
Feb. 14, 2007 ("It is estimated that 80 to 120 billion dollars in the United States is lost to
insurance fraud every year.").
29 The National Insurance Crime Bureau estimates the average American household pays
higher insurance rates as a result of company losses from insurance fraud. Insurance Fraud:
the Basics, National Insurance Crime Bureau Fact Sheets,
Understanding
https://www.nicb.org/cps/rde/xchg/nicb/hs.xsl/83.htm (select "Insurance Fraud") (last visited
Mar. 2, 2008). Households likely suffer in other ways; empirical evidence suggests the
insurance industry offers lower initial settlements for claims made in areas where the
perception of policyholder claims exaggeration is strong. See Keith J. Crocker & Sharon
Tennyson, InsuranceFraudand Optimal Claims Settlement Strategies, 45 J.L. & ECON. 469
(2002) (finding "convincing support for the notion that insurers adopt claims payment
strategies designed to mitigate a claimant's incentives to invest resources in inflating injury
claims").
30 New Mexico
Public Regulation Commission, http://www.nmprc.state.nm.us/
consumer.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
MIAMI
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quasi-governmental agency, 31 a majority of whose directors are appointed
by insurance industry associations.32 Massachusetts's model is also unique
in that the two trade industry groups assessed have only a voluntary
membership which may choose to contribute additional monies beyond the
minimum legislatively assessed upon them.33 The second model, followed
by a majority of states, creates a specialized insurance fraud bureau within
the state's Department of Insurance, the Attorney General's Office, or some
other governmental agency.34 The final model, which exists in eight states,
consists of a less formalized interaction of the parties due to the
nonexistence of a formal insurance fraud bureau. In these jurisdictions,
insurance companies or trade organizations provide private investigators to
work in tandem with public officials.
1. The MassachusettsModel

The Massachusetts legislature statutorily created an entity called the
Insurance Fraud Bureau of Massachusetts ("IFB").35 The IFB is considered

31

"Quasi-governmental" is a particularly unclear appellation. Even the United States

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is somewhat unclear about its status. United States v.
Pimental, 380 F.3d 575, 594 (1st Cir. 2004) ("The IFB straddles the line between a
government and a private entity, having attributes of each."). The District Court from which
that appeal was taken was not as convinced of even the "quasi" public nature of the
Massachusetts IFB. See United States v. Pimental, 199 F.R.D. 28, 33 (D. Mass. 2001)
(concluding that "the IFB inhabits a region of the private/public spectrum that is much closer
to a purely private agency"). The First Circuit, however, seemed to be swayed by its
determination that IFB funding as more appropriately "akin to a state-mandated tax on
insurance companies than a voluntary expenditure by private entities." Pimental,380 F.3d at
593.
32The mixed nature of the Board of Directors along with the requirement that the IFB
offer biannual reports sufficient for government oversight is undoubtedly part of the source
of its "quasi-governmental" status. Review of the First Circuit's description of the agency in
Pimentalis useful. See Pimental, 380 F.3d at 592-94.
33 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 427, § 13 (1996). The Massachusetts IFB is unique in that it
only assesses two Massachusetts insurance associations with voluntary membership, the
Automobile Insurance Bureau and the Workers' Compensation Rating and Inspection
Bureau. Id. Also unique to the Massachusetts IFB, a minimum contribution of the two
rating bureaus is mandated by statute, but the rating bureaus may increase their contribution
at their discretion. Id. Portions of the assessments-and contributions, if any-fund the
investigatory and prosecutorial actions of the Insurance Fraud Division of the Attorney
General's Office. Id.
34 Most states mandate assessments on all insurers doing a certain amount of business in
the state. See supra note 7.
35 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 427, § 13 (1996). The IFB website describes the agency as
follows:
The Insurance Fraud Bureau of Massachusetts is a unique and multifaceted investigative agency
dedicated to the systematic elimination of fraudulent insurance transactions. Authorized by an
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by courts to be a "quasi-governmental" agency.36 It employs approximately
thirty full-time investigators.37
The IFB is not a pure governmental agency, in the sense that the
majority of its Board of Directors are not public officials 38 and it is funded
by a special assessment rather than general revenues. 39 IFB funds derive
from the assessment on two insurance company trade associations in which
membership is voluntary. These two associations each provide five of the
IFB Board's directors, for a total often of the fifteen members of the Board,
with the remaining five being public officials. The IFB's purpose is to
investigate allegations of insurance fraud referred to it and, when
appropriate, refer these allegations to various prosecutorial offices for
further action.
The method through which the IFB receives its cases is also
noteworthy. The vast majority of its cases are acquired by direct referral
from insurance companies who are statutorily obligated to advise the IFB of
their suspicions whenever they "have reason to believe" that an insurance
transaction may be fraudulent. 40 Once the IFB receives a referral from
Act of the Massachusetts Legislature and signed into law in 1990, the Insurance Fraud Bureau
undertakes cases for investigation and preparation for criminal prosecution.
The Bureau is wholly funded by the insurance industry in Massachusetts. In addition to
investigators, the I.F.B. has a research division, a legal division and an administrative division.
Insurance Fraud Bureau personnel work with insurance companies' claim and investigative
staffs, local, state and federal police departments and agencies in other states to accomplish our
mission of prevention, investigationand prosecution of fraudulent insurance activity.
Overview, Insurance Fraud Bureau, http://www.ifb.org/overview.htm (last visited Mar. 2,

2008) (emphasis in original).
36 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has referred to the IFB as a
"quasi-governmental" agency with sufficient government interest to allow their access to
grand jury materials. Pimental,380 F.3d at 596.
37 See Overview, Insurance Fraud Bureau, http://www.ifb.org/overview.htm (last visited
Mar. 2, 2008).
" Pimental, 380 F.3d at 592. The IFB is subject to state oversight. See id. at 593
("Although only a third of the IFB's board members are public officials, the IFB's purpose,
organizational scheme, and basic operations are all dictated by statute. And while the IFB's
day-to-day administration within the framework is, in large part, controlled by individuals
who are not public officials, it is also subject to the constant oversight of the Massachusetts
legislature, to which the IFB must submit a report every six months.").
39 See supra note 32.
40

Who Must Refer: Insurance company personnel who have reason to believe that a Massachusetts
insurance transaction may be fraudulent, or who have knowledge that a fraudulent transaction is
about to take place, or has taken place in Massachusetts, are required by Massachusetts law to
report the suspected fraud to the Insurance Fraud Bureau of Massachusetts (IFB).
The IFB Referral Process and Procedures, May 2004, http://www.ifb.org/REFERRAL%
20PROCESS/refP/20process%20internet%20updated.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2008)
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either an insurance company or from a call placed to its public "hotline," it
proceeds to investigate the cases under its statutory authority. Case files are
created and reviewed, and when the IFB's executive director "is satisfied
that a material fraud, deceit, or intentional misrepresentation has been
committed in an insurance transaction, he must refer the matter to the
attorney general, the appropriate district attorney or the United States
attorney."' 1 The Massachusetts IFB is unquestionably busy. In 2005, for
example, it oversaw 3829 cases of suspected insurance fraud,42
approximately 85% of which emanated directly from insurance
companies.4 3 Of the cases referred, prosecuting authorities subsequently
were given 146 cases of suspected insurance fraud.44
In Massachusetts, like other states, the funds acquired by the
assessment are not limited to the support of the IFB investigative agency;
the statute additionally authorizes and requires that a certain portion of the
industry assessment be available to the Massachusetts Attorney General's
Office.4 5 According to the implementing legislation, if the Massachusetts
Attorney General avails himself of these funds, he must use them on
matters referred to his office by the IFB, and he must designate a total of at
least thirteen assistant attorneys general to work full-time on these
matters. 46 Moreover, the IFB has offered various types of "in-kind support"
to these Fraud Division prosecutors41:
[W]hile the legislative scheme does not explicitly provide for the transfer of
resources, monetary or otherwise, between the IFB and the Fraud Division, the IFB
(emphasis in original); see also 1990 Mass. Acts 380, amended by § 99 of 1991 Mass. Acts
398, and § 13 of 1996 Mass. Acts 427.
41 Pimental, 380 F.3d at 592.
42 INSURANCE FRAUD BUREAU OF MASSACHUSETTS ANNUAL REPORT

2 (2006), available

at http://www.ifb.org/2006_IFBAnnualReport.pdf.
43 Id. at 15. This is a significant departure from the IFB's first year of operations. See
Commonwealth v. Ellis, 8 Mass. L. Rptr. 678, at *13 (Super. Ct. 1998) ("Over the course of
its first seven years, the IFB has received approximately 12,863 reports of insurance fraud:
6,566 of these reports came from insurance companies (51% of the total); 5,337 originated
from the public (41% of the total).").
44 INSURANCE FRAUD BUREAU OF MASSACHUSETTS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 1.
45 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 427, § 13 (1996); see also Ellis, 8 Mass. L. Rptr., at *21
(explaining the process and noting that "[e]nclosed with the letter [from the Massachusetts
Executive Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation] is an invoice for the 'AGO
Assessment,' to be remitted to the state Division of Insurance. On a quarterly basis, the AIB
and WCRIB [the assessed trade organizations] each issue a check, payable to the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The checks are deposited into the Office of the Attorney
General's subaccount of the General Fund, and are specifically designated for the Fraud
Division. The Office of the Attorney General subsequently uses those funds to pay the
salary, fringe benefits and indirect costs of the Fraud Division assistant attorneys general").
46 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 427, § 13 (1996).
47 Ellis, 8 Mass. L. Rptr., at *23.
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has nevertheless provided in-kind support to the Fraud Division by assisting with the
investigation of cases assigned for prosecution. This assistance has consisted of
obtaining documents, interviewing witnesses, serving subpoenas, providing charts and
photographs, and arranging for handwriting and accident reconstruction experts. On
occasion, IFB investigators have provided airline tickets or other travel
reimbursement for out-of-state witnesses, and the IFB has given the Fraud Division
computer software (the "Excel" spreadsheet program) to assist it in tracking cases. As
specifically relates to this case, the IFB has reimbursed an assistant attorney general
for his purchase of a "Seagate" hard drive, has provided blank computer back-up tapes
and an extension cord to assist the Fraud Division in its investigation and search of the
computer system at the defendant's law firm, and has paid the bill of the computer
expert who assisted in settin 8up the Ellis & Ellis computer system in preparation for
the Commonwealth's search.

Though the IFB may refer their cases to any prosecutor's office,
including the United States Attorney or local District Attorney, they refer
the vast majority of their cases to the Attorney General's funded
prosecutors. In an amicus curiae brief submitted by the American Civil
Liberties Union critiquing the Massachusetts IFB financial structure, the
ACLU particularly pointed to the availability of restitution only in cases
handled by the Attorney General in administrative hearings as an
"incentive," which could partially explain the higher referral rate to the
Attorney General's office.49

In any such novel funding scheme for a prosecutorial office, questions
of propriety will inevitably arise. Arguably, a minimum annual assessment
or any legislatively mandated scheme lessens the pressure on investigators
or prosecutors to become partisans of their funding industry by infusing
public authority into the funding program.50 Clearly, the interests of an IFB
office investigator or funded prosecutor are different from those of a purely
private investigator or purely private prosecutor. However, a conclusion
that public authorization reduces the amount of private influence in criminal
prosecution vis-A-vis a purely private investigation or prosecution varies
significantly from a determination that such system allows for no influence
or no improper influence. Moreover, to determine the potential for
prosecutorial bias, an analysis of the influence such funding has on IFB
investigators, as well as prosecutors, must be included in any legitimate
inquiry into the risks such system poses to prosecutorial neutrality and,
importantly, the public perception of that risk.51
48 Id.

49 Brief of Amici Curiae Public Citizen, American Civil Liberties Union of
Massachusetts, and Common Cause of Massachusetts, Commonwealth v. Ellis, No. SJC07846 (Mass. Nov. 9, 1998) [hereinafter ACLU Brief].
50 See Kennedy, supra note 8, at n. 131.
51 The Massachusetts IFB is not simply some form of complaint screener for the
Attorney General's Office; rather, the IFB proactively assists in investigating and
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The Alliance funding system in Massachusetts has undergone one
significant challenge to date.
In Commonwealth v. Ellis,5 2 the
Massachusetts system was challenged by attorney-defendants accused of
insurance fraud. Objecting to the funding relationship between the
insurance companies, the IFB, and the prosecution, the defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the insurance fraud indictments, disqualify prosecuting
counsel, or both.53 In their motion, the defendants contended that the
assistant attorneys general prosecuting their state criminal cases were
impermissibly biased due to the novel statutory scheme54 funding the IFB
and the Insurance Fraud Division."
After a nonevidentiary hearing, the motion to dismiss was denied by
the trial court,56 and the denial was later affirmed by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court.5 7 The latter court concluded that the prosecution
had not deprived the defendants of any constitutional right, although a
majority of the Court expressed concern that the close relationship between
the IFB and the Insurance Fraud Division might be "difficult to justify on
policy grounds. 58
Subsequently, the attorney-defendants filed a pretrial habeas corpus
petition in the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts. 59 The Federal District Court was markedly unsettled by the
unusual relationship between the state and the insurance companies, as it
ordered the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to respond to the defendant's
discovery requests and scheduled an evidentiary hearing to take place one
month before the state court trial was scheduled to commence. 60 As a
result, the Commonwealth filed two successive petitions for extraordinary
relief with the First Circuit Court of Appeals, seeking to reverse the district

prosecuting cases. For instance, the IFB has provided computers to the Attorney General's
office to assist in complex investigations and paid travel fees for accident reconstruction and
medical expert witnesses. Ellis, 8 Mass. Rptr. at *23.
52 id.
53id.

Among other unique aspects to the Massachusetts system, the implementing
legislation allows for the insurance industry associations to voluntarily increase their
contributions to the system. See supra note 26.
55Ellis, 8 Mass. Rptr. at *23
56 id.
57 Commonwealth v. Ellis, 708 N.E.2d 644 (Mass. 1999).
58 Id. at 654.
59In re Justices of the Super. Ct. Dep't of the Mass. Trial Ct., 218 F.3d 11 (1st Cir.
54

2000).

60 Id. at 14. In a second order, the district court also denied motions by the IFB and the
Commonwealth to quash defendant's requests to depose four IFB board members. Id.at 15.
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court's order and quash depositions of four IFB Board members. 61 The
Commonwealth maintained that the pretrial habeas proceedings in federal
court unduly interfered with the ongoing criminal proceeding in the state
trial court. While the First Circuit abstained in favor of the pending state
prosecution,6 2 it took the extraordinary step of issuing a writ of advisory
mandamus,63 instructing the district court to dismiss the defendant's habeas
petition without prejudice.64
Although the First Circuit denied a full discovery process allowing
clarification of the IFB's relationship to the Massachusetts Attorney
General's Office, this case reveals how this arrangement will engender
concern throughout the country. As the First Circuit itself noted, even the
concept of granting federal habeas relief for a "disinterested prosecutor"
claim was an issue of first impression.65 Inevitably, as each state expands
its relationship with private industries as part of their ongoing prosecutorial
process, these arrangements will come under varying forms of
constitutional scrutiny.
2. The Majority Model
Most states do not follow the Massachusetts model of having a special
private or minimally "quasi-public" insurance fraud bureau. Instead, the
majority of states place their insurance fraud unit within existing
governmental departments,66 frequently either as a division of the state's
regulatory Department of Insurance or within the Attorney General's
Office.
Currently, there are forty-seven "majority model" fraud bureaus in
thirty-nine states.67 In these jurisdictions, just as in Massachusetts, the

62

Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 21.

63

Id. at 13-15 (discussing the distinction between supervisory and advisory mandamus

61

and its appropriateness in this context). The First Circuit sought to express the extraordinary
nature of its decision from the outset, stating that "we determine that this case poses an issue
of such importance, and one so elemental to the proper role of the federal judiciary in our
constitutional scheme, as to warrant the issuance of an advisory mandamus granting the
requested relief." Id. at 13.
'4 Id. at 22.
65

Id. at 16.

66

Louisiana, for instance, integrated its insurance fraud unit within its state police force.

Despite its unusual location, the office works much the same as those offices housed within
Departments of Insurance or as in the Massachusetts model, with 62% of its referrals
received from insurance carriers. LA. DEP'T OF INS., STATE OF LA., PLAN OF OPERATION FOR
THE LOUISIANA AUTO THEFT AND INSURANCE FRAUD PREVENTION AUTHORITY (2004),

available at http://www.ldi.state.la.us/Documents/LegalServices/LATIFPA/Plan
Operation for LATIFPA.pdf.
67 See COALITION AGAINST INSURANCE FRAUD, supra note 1, at 3, 10.

of
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insurance companies refer suspected cases of insurance fraud to state
insurance fraud bureaus, which in turn investigate the cases and refer a
percentage to state prosecutorial authorities. Since these fraud bureaus
typically function under the auspices of some state agency, they are often
imbued with law enforcement powers and their agents may execute search
warrants 68 and carry weapons. 69 In 2003, over 125,000 cases were referred
by insurers to these various state bureaus for the investigation of potential
insurance fraud.7 °
The large number of referrals is not surprising given most states have a
legislatively mandated referral process. In New York, for example, just as
in Massachusetts, insurance companies are required by law to submit any
suspected cases of insurance fraud to the Bureau.71 Moreover, New York
law requires insurance companies that conduct business in the state to
maintain Special Investigation Units internally for the purpose of
72
investigating suspected fraudulent activity. Thus, in 2006, the New York
Insurance Fraud Bureau received 22,884 reports of suspected insurance
fraud, of which 22,158 originated from insurance companies. In turn, the
Bureau referred 274 cases to prosecutors.73
68 See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 8 Mass. L. Rptr. 678 (Super. Ct. 1998).
69

The New York bureau, one of the pioneering agencies of its kind, was created when

the state legislature in 1981 established "a team of investigators" to pursue "cases of
suspected insurance fraud for criminal prosecutions and civil penalties." See Frank Orlando,
Welcome to the New York Insurance Fraud Bureau 2, http://www.ins.state.ny.us/
acrobat/fdbrch07.pdf [hereinafter Orlando, Welcome] (last visited Apr. 19, 2008). Its staff
investigators, which are required by statute to be "seasoned professionals with years of
experience in law enforcement and insurance fraud investigation," are designated as peace
officers under New York law. Id. at 3. This authority gives them the ability to carry
firearms and effectuate arrests. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 2.10 (McKinney 2007).
Interestingly, recent iterations of the IFB have seen these investigators assisting other aspects
of the New York Department of Insurance in their insurance company regulatory capacity.
See Orlando, Welcome, supra, at 4 ("For the past several years, members of the Bureau have
accompanied the Health Bureau in financial evaluations and the Property/Casualty Bureau
on market conduct examinations. The purpose of this assignment is to evaluate insurer
compliance with Department regulations and New York Insurance Law."). New York,
however, appears to be unusual in having its Frauds Bureau assist in its regulatory mission.
70 This is an average of 2500 cases per insurance fraud bureau for 2003. This number is
an overwhelming increase from even five years prior, when in 1998 Insurance Fraud
Bureaus around the country received over 92,000 referrals about suspected insurance fraud.
According to J. Joseph Cohen, director of the Kentucky Insurance Fraud Investigative
Division and acting chairman of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners'
anti-fraud task force, 75% of these referrals came directly from insurance companies. See
Amanda Levin, Antifraud Activity Gets Results, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Sept. 13, 1999, at 16.
71N.Y. INS. LAW § 405 (Consol. 2007).
72 Id. § 409.
73 INS. DEP'T, STATE OF N.Y., THE ANNUAL

REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR

AND THE

LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE INSURANCE FRAUDS
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In these majority model jurisdictions, funding of these units by
legislatively mandated assessment is common, with varying percentages of
the assessed funds allocated to investigators and prosecutors according to
the relevant state's statutory code. Some states, like New York, do not have
insurance fraud-specific assessment legislation; rather assessments are a
source of funding for the entire Department of Insurance, including its
regulators.74 Other states, like Pennsylvania, have their insurance fraud
division prosecutors funded entirely by the assessment, with no money
coming from the general funds.75
Arguably, any version of the majority model safeguards against
institutional influence on the criminal justice process to a greater extent
than the Massachusetts model, if for no other reason than that their Fraud
Bureau directors are public officials. This is particularly so in jurisdictions
such as New York which have industry-assessed funds intermingled within
overall department budgets. It is tempting to read the likelihood of
perceived influence as a direct correlation to the exclusivity of the funding
scheme, particularly if our understanding of the public's perception of
influence is connected to the overt use of private assets on prosecutorial
decision-making. This understanding, however, may be overly simplistic.
To the extent influence is the metric for propriety, funding is simply one
PREVENTION ACT 6 (2006), available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/acrobat/fd06ar2g.pdf.
Another fifty-four cases were referred by the Bureau for civil settlement or sent to the
Department of Insurance's Office of General Counsel for civil proceedings. Id. In a 2006
report, the New York Insurance Fraud Bureau delineated its relationship with state
prosecutors as follows: "Under a program initiated in 2003, Frauds Bureau investigators are
assigned to prosecutors' offices to work side-by-side with their investigative staff. During
2006 the Bureau had investigators in 11 prosecutors' offices across the State." Id. at 20. In
addition, the report states that Fraud Bureau agents worked in tandem with the FBI and the
U.S. Attorney's Office. Id. at 4. In 2001, then-Governor George Pataki appointed the
Attorney General as Special Prosecutor for Insurance Fraud. Id.
A similar arrangement exists in Florida, where the Division of Insurance Fraud receives
over 13,000 case referrals annually, mostly from insurance companies, resulting in
approximately 800 arrests each year. In Virginia, insurance companies referred 1638
suspected insurance fraud cases to state authorities in 2005, up from just 200 in 2000. See
Iris Taylor, FraudCalled the "DarkSide" of Insurance, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH (Va.),
Mar. 19, 2006, at D1.
74 Still, even in New York, insurance industry-assessed funds are relevant. New York's
Department of Insurance is significantly, though not completely, funded by industry
assessment. For example, New York's assessed funds account for a greater proportion of the
Department's budget than general tax revenues, and the funding of insurance fraud
prosecutors is included in the disbursement of assessed funds. Funding of this office is
provided as a sub-allocation of resources from the general Insurance Department Budget.
See ALAN HEVESI, N.Y. STATE INS. DEP'T, A REPORT BY THE NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF
THE
STATE
COMPTROLLER,
2004-S-73
(Mar.
31,
2004),
available at
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/audits/allaudits/093005/04s73.pdf.
75 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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avenue of inferring the degree of that influence.7 6 These systems also create
formalized relationships between industry and government personnel with
varying levels of financial independence. These structured relationships
likewise can be seen as a source of perceived risk on the independence of
the prosecutor.
3. The Informal Alliance
In eight states, including Indiana and Illinois, no dedicated separate
Insurance Fraud Bureau is present at the state level.77 Nevertheless, the
Alliance still exists, albeit in a less formal manner.
Where there are no dedicated insurance crime agencies, industry-wide
advocacy groups such as the National Insurance Crime Bureau ("NICB")
often step in to fill the gap by conducting initial investigations, referring
cases, and offering "expert" assistance to local police and prosecutors.7 8 In
cases where an NICB complaint results in prosecution, the investigator can
often exercise substantial influence on the prosecution of the case.79 Since
the local district attorney and police are likely to lack specialized
knowledge of the insurance industry, they may use an NICB liaison to
supply that expertise.
B. THE INFERENCE OF INFLUENCE
1. Inferences of Industry Influence in the FormalAlliance
80
The creation of a mandated Massachusetts Alliance has influenced
the character 81 and procedure of prosecuting units to a surprising extent.
76

This conception of analyzing the entire factual background, including, but not limited

to, monies paid, is echoed by the California courts in their interpretation of the application of
California's prosecutorial disqualification standard. See Hambarian v. Super. Ct. of Orange
County, 44 P.3d 102, 107 (Cal. 2002).
77 See COALITION AGAINST INSURANCE FRAUD, supra note 1, at 4.
78 See Daniels v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65896
(N.D. Ind. 2006).
79See discussion of Danielsv. Liberty Mutual infra Part II.B.2.
80 When favoritism can reasonably be construed to have occurred as a result of influence
on the prosecutor's individual or office's institutional decision-making, the notion of
equality interests are also implicated. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 674 ("Favoring one
victim over another as a result of personal influence violates the other victim's equality
interests.").
81 Even in the absence of any other consideration or influence, the ability of an industry
to finance prosecution of crimes affecting its financial interests creates an avenue for
preferential access to justice. See id. at 706 ("Even if private financing does not diminish the
access of justice to others, the privately financed victim will enjoy preferential access to
justice by virtue of her wealth. A two-tier system of criminal justice would develop in which
privately financed cases would enjoy the best experts and services while publicly financed
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For instance, in several federal insurance fraud prosecutions arising from
Massachusetts IFB investigations, attorneys from the United States
Attorney's Office shared grand jury transcripts with IFB personnel. 82 A
review of these cases reflects a changing understanding of the nature of
these investigators and the application of the grand jury secrecy rule. 3 In
one early case, where the Government sought a court order prior to
disclosing the grand jury transcripts, the district court held that IFB
investigators were private personnel who were not permitted to receive such
Another district court reached a similar
confidential information.84
conclusion where prosecutors disclosed grand jury minutes without seeking
permission and the disclosure was revealed during pretrial discovery. In a
subsequent decision, the First Circuit held that rather than being a purely
private agency, the IFB was under sufficient state control to render it a
hybrid "quasi-governmental" entity.8 6 Consequently, depending on the
facts of the case and the degree of IFB participation in the investigation, its
personnel may be sufficiently "governmental" as to permit disclosure of
confidential grand jury materials.87 As can be seen by this progression of
cases, at least Massachusetts courts are becoming more comfortable with
expanding the definition of what had once been presumed to be a private
investigator88 to constitute a "public" agent permitted access to grand jury
minutes in certain circumstances.8 9

cases would be left to compete for their share of limited public funds. A rich victim might
get a better prosecution than a poor victim. This threat to equality makes no assumption
about influence or trade-offs between cases.").
82 See United States v. Pimental, 380 F.3d 575, 596 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v.
McElroy, 392 F. Supp. 2d 115, 116-17 (D. Mass. 2005); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 158
F. Supp. 2d 96 (D. Mass. 2001).
83 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). For a excellent examination of this topic, see Mark Kadish,
Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its
Process,24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1996).
84 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 158 F. Supp. 2d at 118 (holding that the IFB are not
"government personnel" and denying release of grand jury information to them).
85 See United States v. Pimental, 199 F.R.D. 28, 34-36 (D. Mass. 2001).
86 Pimental, 380 F.3d at 596-98; see also McElroy, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 116-17 ("It is clear
that in certain circumstances, an employee or employees of the Massachusetts Insurance
Fraud Bureau (IFB) can be granted access to grand jury material as 'government personnel'
as provided in Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii), Fed. R. Crim. P., but the grant of access for IFB personnel
is not automatic.").
87 See McElroy, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 116-17.
88 See Pimental, 199 F.R.D. at 33 ("It is quite obvious that the Supreme Judicial Court
never doubted IFB's status as a private, non-governmental agency in Ellis. A close reading
of Ellis discloses that the court presumed the private nature of the IFB throughout its
opinion.").
89 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
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Because of the confidential nature of grand jury information and the
appearance of unfair influence or access, it is troubling that in
Massachusetts the majority of the IFB Board consists of private appointees.
Even more troubling, however, is that these Massachusetts prosecutors have
demonstrably come to view the insurance carriers as sufficiently "clientlike" 90 in their relationship with the prosecutor's office to allow for the
perception of inappropriate influence. 9' Phrases like "punish ' 92 and
"target" 93 were used by trial lawyers' associations to reflect their perception
of the Alliance's capacity to influence prosecutorial charging to the
lawyers' presumptive detriment.94
Additionally, trial lawyers clearly perceive the prosecutors as
inappropriately conflicted. 95 Such perception is fairly justified given that,
during the Ellis96 litigation, it became apparent that although the privately
funded insurance fraud unit of the Attorney General's office had a statutory
mandate to prosecute frauds committed by, as well as against, insurance
companies, it had never actually done so when the only victim was a
claimant.97 The Massachusetts Association of Trial Attorneys ("MATA")
specifically noted that the Fraud Division in fact rejected
"insurer fraud"
98
cases on the ground of perceived conflicts of interest:

90

Arrangements such as the Massachusetts model, where prosecutors are funded but are

not directly retained or employed by the insurance carriers, have not been established as
creating a true attorney-client relationship. If, however, the Massachusetts prosecutors were
purely private, their duty of loyalty to their insurance company financier-victims would be
clear. A private prosecutor represents both the victim who pays for their services and society
at large. See John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionalityof Private
Prosecutors,47 ARK. L. REv. 511, 584 & n.322 (1994). As such, the private prosecutor is
ethically precluded from acting against that individual's interests or taking an adverse
position to him in subsequent litigation. See United States v. Young, 481 U.S. 787, 805
(1987).
91See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 708 N.E.2d 644 (Mass. 1999); ACLU Brief, supra note
49, at 21.
92ATLA Brief, supra note 22, at *4.
93 Id. at 4-5.
94 Id.

95See Brief of Amici Curiae The Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys and The
Massachusetts Bar Association, Commonwealth v. Ellis, No. SJC-07846 (Mass. December
2, 1998), 1998 WL 35031552, at *5 [hereinafter MATA Brief] ("The legislation establishes
in the Attorney General's insurance fraud division an institutional conflict of interest which
creates-at the very least-the appearance that the financial influence of private parties has
permeated the law enforcement process.").
96 See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 8 Mass. L. Rptr. 678, n.39 (Super. Ct. 1998); see also
ACLU Brief, supra note 49, at 21
97See ACLU Brief, supra note 49, at 21.
98 See MATA Brief, supra note 95, at 38 & n.5.
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[Miembers of MATA have presented evidence of fraudulent behavior on behalf of
insurers to the Fraud Division. These MATA members were told by the Fraud
Division that they would need to investigate the matter themselves because of a
"potential conflict" for the Fraud Division to investigate the matter because of its ties
99
with the IFB.

In fact, when MATA offered evidence of a pattern of fraud committed
against policyholders by medical professionals hired by insurance
companies to conduct examinations of policyholders in relation to their
claims, one of the prosecutors involved in the Ellis prosecution "declined to
conduct an investigation on 'the
grounds that such an investigation would
00
present a 'potential conflict."'
The Fraud Division prosecutors' decision to decline to investigate
allegations of insurer fraud similarly perturbed the Massachusetts ACLU,
which noted in its amicus brief that
[a]lthough insurers themselves are listed as potential targets for prosecution, the Fraud
Division has never prosecuted a single case against an insurer, or an agent of an
insurer, when the only victim was a claimant. As long as insurers are funding the
Fraud Division and the IFB, fraud by insurers will remain under, if ever,
prosecuted. 101

Such actions are certainly suggestive. The fact that a Massachusetts
Insurance Fraud Division Assistant Attorney General perceived his
relationship with the insurance industry as sufficiently close to preclude his
investigation of a fraud case does augment the perception that the
Massachusetts model creates an untenable conflict of interest situation. For
this reason, it was not unreasonable for these trial lawyer associations to
infer that such conflicting interest must also be implicated when a Fraud
Division prosecutor exercises his discretion in claimant insurance fraud
prosecutions. In other words, MATA, the ACLU, and the other Ellis amici
clearly perceive these conflicting interests as so systemic to the institution
that disqualification is appropriate even in the absence of an actual
attorney-client relationship with an insurance carrier.10 2 That any

99Id. (emphasis in original).
potential conflict were not given.

The grounds for the prosecutor's determination of the

100 Id. at 38.

101ACLU Brief, supra note 49, at 21.

102The ethical rules governing prosecutors make it clear that they have a responsibility to
the defendant. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2008) ("[A] prosecutor has the

responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility
carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice.").
Moreover, prosecuting a case under such a conflict implicates serious due process concerns.
See Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22 (Va. 1985) ("A conflict of interest on the part
of the prosecution, in itself, constitutes a denial of defendant's due process rights.").
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prosecutor would disqualify himself from investigating insurance company
fraud as a potential conflict of interest supports such an inference.
An inference of conflicting interests' influence on a prosecutor in the
charging phase is particularly problematic because this area of prosecutorial
discretion is beyond the criminal justice system's capacity to meaningfully
review. 0 3 Therefore, the Massachusetts prosecutor's refusal to investigate
allegations of insurer fraud due to a potential conflict of interest would be
particularly troubling to those lawyers most likely to be 104
subjected to IFB
scrutiny for their own representation of covered claimants.
In any event, it seems logically inconsistent that circumstances could
justify failing to bring fraud cases against insurance companies and yet
allow for the recusal of a prosecutor on conflict-of-interest grounds without
the obvious perception that some corollary diminution of that office's
ability to remain properly impartial exists. Though the Massachusetts
courts were unconvinced of this conclusion, it defies credulity that a public
prosecutor would identify a potential conflict sufficient to prevent his office
from investigating allegations of insurer fraud without at least some indicia
of a potential conflict of loyalty existing for the prosecutor when
investigating allegations of policyholder insurance fraud.
Though other legislative funding schemes for insurance fraud cases
differ among the various states, some analogous inferences could be drawn.
Fully "governmental" model states like Pennsylvania are funded in a
manner very similar to Massachusetts's. 0 5 The implementing legislation
for the Pennsylvania Insurance Fraud Prevention Authority is specifically
designed to keep the assessed monies completely separate from the state's

103

See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 674 ("The criminal justice system is not structured to

protect against partiality of the prosecutor to some private interest because the prosecutor's
decisions about whom to prosecute and to what extent to prosecute are not subject to
meaningful review.").
104 The noted lack of disciplinary enforcement of prosecutorial ethics violations may
contribute to the urgency of this perception See Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional
Discipline of Prosecutors,79 N.C. L. REV. 721 (2001) (reviewing the plethora of applicable
ethical and regulatory prosecutorial disciplinary rules and determining that they appear
underutilized); see also Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics
Codes to Include the Non-Adversarial Roles of FederalProsecutors, 37 B.C. L. REV. 923,
930-34 (1996) (discussing the role of the prosecutor as "an advocate without a singular
client" and "without a singular purpose"); Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek
Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 626 n.84 (1999) (arguing that a prosecutor's singular
client is the state, rather than the victims, police, or any other constituency); Fred C.
Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do
Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 57 (1991) [hereinafter Zacharias, Can Prosecutors Do
Justice?] (discussing prosecutors' various constituencies).
105 See 40 PA. STAT. ANN. § 325.23 (2007).
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general revenues.10 6 Those monies are held in a restricted trust and are not
considered "general revenue of the Commonwealth."' 10 7 Use of the funds is
restricted to "effectuate" only the purposes of the Insurance Fraud
Prevention Authority's implementing legislation. 0 8 Additionally, in the
event of IFPA's dissolution, such funds remaining in the trust would be
returned to the assessed insurance companies, after deducting only the costs
to the state in closing down the office.'0 9 If funding is pertinent to a
there seems little difference in the
determination of loyalties, 1
Pennsylvania funding system (the restricted funds of which may create a
sense of obligation) and the Massachusetts system.
2. Industry Influence in the Informal Alliance
Though it is tempting to conclude that the legislative mandate creating
formal insurance fraud bureaus is itself the sole source of perceptions of
improper influence on the prosecutorial process, the informal Alliance
structure suggests otherwise. This is illustrated in Daniels v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co.,1 11 which involves a district court's determination of
whether a "NICB" investigator could be considered an "employee of the
government" for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act. 1 2 After having
been acquitted of criminal charges stemming from alleged insurance fraud,
Rick Daniels, a Liberty Mutual policyholder, sued his insurance company
and various allied parties for malicious prosecution. 113 Among the lead
prosecution was Joseph Jaskolski, an investigator
figures in the 1underlying
14
for the NICB.
The NICB and Jaskolski asked the district court to certify that
Jaskolski was acting as an "employee for the government" ' 15 at the time of
the Daniels prosecution and hence was entitled to immunity pursuant to the

106

The funds are kept in a special trust fund administered by the State Treasurer. Id.

§ 325.23(a). All interest earned from the investment or deposit of monies accumulated in the
fund are deposited in the fund for the same use. Id.
107 Id. § 325.23(b).
108 Id.

109Id. § 325.23(g).
110 See People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 320 (Cal. 1996) (recognizing the ability of
financing to create a sense of institutional obligation to the funding party).
111Daniels v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:06CV213, 2006 WL 3239994 (N.D. Ind.
2006).
112 Id. at *1.
113 Id.
114

Id.

115 Id.
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Federal Employee Litigation Reform and Tort Compensation Act.1 16 The
evidence proffered by Jaskolski and the NICB in support of this motion
revealed that Jaskolski was the primary moving force behind Daniels's
investigation and prosecution. 1 7 Not only did he refer the Daniels case to
the FBI, 1 8 but he assisted the FBI agent assigned to the case in conducting
the investigation 1 9 and had access to grand jury information.1 20 The
government's identification with Jaskolski was so strong that when Daniels
sought discovery of grand jury materials, "the Government actually argued
that Jaskolski was Government personnel," 12 ' who, as such, "must not
122
disclose a matter occurring before the grand jury.'
In his affidavit, Jaskolski further attested that he had accompanied FBI
24
23
Agent Campbell on interviews of witnesses1 and on-site inspections,1
assisted in reviewing documents,1 25 escorted witnesses at the grand jury
proceeding,1 26 and assisted the United States Attorney at trial.1 27 He further
maintained that he acted "under the direct supervision and control"' 128 of
either the FBI or the United States Attorney in conducting these activities,
and hence "did only what [he] was told to do by either Agent Campbell or
Id. at *1-12.

116

The Federal Employee Litigation Reform and Tort Compensation Act,

known as the Westfall Act, amended the Federal Tort Claims Act to extend governmental
immunity from liability to federal employees sued for tortious conduct occurring within the
scope of their employment. Id.
117 Id. at *4 (explaining that "[t]he NICB received a request from Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company to investigate a claim made by Liberty Mutual's insureds, the Daniels.
Jaskolski opened a case file, gathered information for three or four weeks, then contacted the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ('FBI')").
1 Id. at *4.
19 Id. at *4-5 ("Jaskolski described the relationship as a joint investigation with the
FBI.").
120

Id. at *5 (noting the government's relationship with Jaskolski was so close that "the

United States Attorney's Office treated Jaskolski as if he fell within the provision of Rule
6(e)(3)(A)(ii) that permits disclosure of grand jury matters to government personnel").
121 Id. at *16.
122 Id. at *6 (citing FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(e)(2)(B)). When Daniels requested that grand jury
information disclosed to Jaskolski be divulged, Jaskolski opposed the motion, contending
that he was "government personnel" for the purposes of Rule 6(e). Although the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit declined to decide whether he was or was not
"government personnel" for this purpose, the court held that, even if he was not, the
government erred in good faith by treating him as such and the information should not be
divulged. Jaskolski v. Daniels, No. 2:03CV479, 2006 WL 2927593, at *6 & n.2 (N.D. Ind.
Oct. 12, 2006), aff'd Jaskolski v. Daniels, 427 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2005).
123 Daniels, 2006 WL 3239994, at *8.
124 Id.
125

Id.

126 Id.
127
128

Id. at *9.
Id. at *8.
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AUSA Butler, or other FBI agents and U.S. Attorneys." 29 Regardless of
who was nominally controlling whom, however, it is clear that Jaskolski at
least had an unusually symbiotic relationship with the FBI and the United
States Attorney. For instance, at Daniels's trial, even though introduced as
a representative of the NICB, he sat at the prosecution table,130 retrieved
documents for the' 32government,'3 1 and "considered himself part of the
prosecution team."'
Despite Jaskolski's contentions of FBI and prosecutorial control of his
actions, the court concluded he was not entitled to governmental immunity
and allowed the suit for malicious prosecution to go forward. 33 In this
case, the scope of interaction between the NICB and the prosecution was
striking, particularly given there was no formal, legislatively mandated
relationship between the NICB and the United States Attorney's office for
the Northern District of Indiana. Thus, inferences of influence can be found
even in the absence of a legislatively mandated scheme and any proper
conflicts analysis should allow for inquiry and review of non-monetary
interactions as part of its appraisal.
III. THE BIG CHILL: How THE ALLIANCE CHILLS THE RIGHTS OF
POLICYHOLDERS AND INHIBITS THE LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT THEM

The intertwinement of private interests with public functions, as
represented by the various forms of the Alliance, requires an examination of
its consequences for legitimate claimants and access of those claimants to
legal representation.
A. A CHILL IS IN THE AIR
Arguably, success for these fraud bureaus should most correctly be
measured by their avowed purpose: specific deterrence of fraudulent claims.
Massachusetts IFB newsletters, however, seem to reflect that little effort is
being made to gauge whether its initiatives have successfully reduced
fraudulent claims, as opposed to having succeeded in generally deterring all
claims-making. Instead, success appears to be measured solely by the

129 Id.
130

Id. at *9.In his affidavit, Jaskolski said that he did not report to anyone at the NICB

any information regarding the Daniels investigation or prosecution. Id. However, during the
time of the Daniels case he did concurrently work on other cases "assigned to him by his
supervisor at the NICB." Id. at *10.
131 Id. at

*9.

132 Id.
'

Id. at *21.
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For example, the
metric of reduced claims dollars generally. 34
Massachusetts IFB published a newsletter entitled focusFraud which
offered some insights as to its stated and inferred goals. In November 2006,
the newsletter contained a story headlined Good News! Effects of CIFI
[Community Insurance Fraud Initiatives] Continue to Impress, which
stated,
The 2005 numbers are in-and the formulation of Community Insurance Fraud
Initiatives (CIFI) in eight Massachusetts urban communities continue to have a
positive effect on the fight against insurance fraud. For the second year, available
statistics show a major reduction of total claim dollars and the number of injury
claims reported since the initiation of the first CIFI program.135

Nor is the IFB unaware that their presence, along with heightened penalties
and greater focus on attorneys, is likely responsible for some of this claim
level. Among reasons cited by the newsletter for this reduction in claims
activity was newly enacted legislation making insurance fraud chargeable
of an "anti-runner bill" focused on attorney
as a felony and the passage
1 36
conduct in acquiring clients.
Prosecutors' statements make it clear that prosecution of attorneys is
within the specific purview of these attempts to deter fraud through
prosecution, and the possibility of an overbroad deterrent result is given
little consideration. For example, highly regarded Philadelphia District
Attorney Lynne Abraham stated at a symposium that shortly after the
Pennsylvania Insurance Fraud Prevention Authority was created, she had
informed the plaintiffs' bar in her jurisdiction 137 that, though her office was
"not interested in prosecuting attorneys,"1 38 it was interested in "deterring
attorneys from considering taking any case which has that faint, but
unmistakable, odor of fraud, which gets stronger and stronger the closer one
digs.", 39
Abraham also explained that insurance company referrals to the new
IFPA could be a benefit to the referring company, as that office represented

134 See 13 FOCusFRAUD 2, Nov. 2006, at 1, available at http://www.ifb.org/FOCUS%
20FRAUD/fP/o2OnovO6%20upd.pdf ("The presence of CIFIs [Community Insurance Fraud
Initiatives] in these major urban areas, combined with other contributing factors, have
resulted in a decrease in claims of over $192 million over the past two years. These
communities make up only 8% of the population, but represent 55% of the statewide
reduction in claims.").
135
136

137

See id. (emphasis added).

Id.
Lynne Abraham, Prosecutionof InsuranceFraud in Philadelphia-ANew Paradigm,

41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 501 (1997).
138 Id. at 505.
139 Id.
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"the best opportunity for a company to make a financial recovery."' 4 ° She
pointed out that her office "use[s] not only our own criminal capacities,
which are unavailable to insurance companies-for example, court ordered
wiretap and electronic surveillance,"' 14' but also the "the possibility of asset
forfeiture, civil in rem and criminal in personam proceedings.' 42
District Attorney Abraham's sentiments, while legitimate, are
somewhat problematic in their unmistakable implications for the trial bar.
While attorneys are by no means immune from criminal prosecution, nor
should they be, the tone of this speech offered implications beyond a
reminder that lawyers are also subject to the law. A case that has the
"unmistakable odor of fraud" to an insurance investigator or prosecutor
might in fact be perfectly legitimate. By informing plaintiffs' attorneys that
they should avoid "considering" cases that bear even a "faint" odor of fraud
or even, for that matter, seek to deter lawyers from considering taking a
case with a strong odor of fraud, there is the clear implication that their
judgments as to the credibility of their client's claim must be made in
consideration of heightened personal criminal consequence. Though such
prosecutorial consequence always existed if a lawyer were to engage in
criminal conduct, what warrants concern is the fact that such statements
43
could easily be construed as prosecutorial comfort with over-deterrence.
Though an attorney's innocence might well be determined by the end of
investigation or trial, in the absence of other safeguards, a reasonable
attorney could well be inhibited from taking cases which would fall within
the purview of the IFPA office as a sheer exercise in personal prudence.
When such decision is weighed alongside cases like Ellis or the infamous
Marks case, discussed infra, such prudence, though detrimental to client
access to representation, appears quite justified.

140

Id. at 503.
504.

141Id. at
142

Id.
is important to remember that the prosecutor's power is immense. Justice Jackson,

143 It

perhaps the most famous prosecutor at Nuremberg, explained as follows:
The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in
America. His discretion is tremendous. He can have citizens investigated ....[H]e can order
arrests, present cases to the grand jury in secret session, and on the basis of his one sided
representation of the facts, can cause citizens to be indicted and held for trial .... While the
prosecutor at his best is one of the most beneficent forces in society, when he acts from malice or
other base motives, he is one of the worst.
Robert H. Jackson, The FederalProsecutor,in ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PROSECUTION 4
(John J.Douglass ed., 1977).
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B. CHILLED POLICYHOLDERS

Upon review of the criteria which the insurance industry uses to
identify potentially fraudulent claims, it becomes apparent that many nonfraudulent claimants would be disinclined to seek indemnity for fear of
triggering a criminal investigation. In effect, a sufficiently expansive
standard for identifying fraudulent claims creates a chilling effect on
claims-making.
"The concept of a 'chilling effect' . . . describes the situation where
persons whose expression is protected are deterred from exercising their
rights by the existence of an overly broad statute."' 144 Although the
"chilling effect" doctrine is most often applied in the context of free speech,
there is a recognized equal danger that a "perceived alliance between
business and the district attorney's office" could chill other legitimate
rights, such as the making of insurance claims. 145 Scholars have noted that
even the perception of an alliance may result in not only fraudulent claims
146
being deterred, but in deterrence of legitimate claims as well.
Additionally, if such perception results in chilling the making of legitimate
claims, the funding industry "derives an additional benefit from not having
to pay these claims."' 147 Such benefit is specific to the allied private
industry and does not necessarily comport with society's interest in
punishing only the guilty.
The potential scope of this chilling effect is illustrated by the NICB's
list of indicators to be used by investigators in determining whether a claim
might "involv[e] medical fraud claim inflation."' 48 Among the pertinent
items on this twelve-factor list are:
1. Three or more occupants in the claimant's vehicle; all of whom report similar
injuries.
2. All injuries are subjectively diagnosed, such as headaches, muscle spasms, traumas
and inability to sleep.

4. All of the claimants submit medical bills from the same doctor or medical facility.

144 Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06CV0997BBM, 2006 WL 1341302, at *55 (N.D. Ga. May 16,
2006).
145 See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 703.
146 id.
147 Id.

148 See Louis J. Papa & Anthony Basile, No-Fault Insurance Fraud: An Overview, 17
TOuRO L. REV. 611,622 (2001).
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7. Vehicle driven by claimant is an old clunker with minimal coverage.

reported.
9. Claimants retain legal representation immediately after the accident is

149

These factors encompass a plethora of legitimate claims. Consider, for
instance, a working-class family of five involved in an accident while on an
outing in the old family station wagon. After the accident, the five victims
go to their family doctor and are diagnosed with soft tissue injuries.
Believing they need legal representation in order to navigate the insurance
claims process, the mother asks her union to recommend an attorney.
These are perfectly innocuous facts, yet an investigator using the NICB's
criteria would find no fewer than five indicators of insurance fraud and
would likely pursue the case as a potentially fraudulent claim.150 This
decision may lead to the hypothetical family experiencing great difficulty in
getting their medical bills paid. 15' Given the existence of the Alliance, the
potential risk to them is much greater, since the insurance companies'

141

Id. at 622-23.
the prosecution is aware of the import of the evidence collected by their

150 Likewise,

investigators, both to the prosecution and the defense. In a Massachusetts IFB focusFraud
newsletter, Glenn Cunha, Chief of the Insurance and Unemployment Fraud Division of the
Office of the Attorney General, wrote a message to IFB investigators reminding them that
"[t]he investigation portion of insurance fraud cases is just one step in the criminal
prosecution." Ins. Fraud Bureau of Mass., Messagefrom Glen Cunha, 12 FocusFRAUD 1,
May 2005, availableat http://www.ifb.org/FOCUS%20FRAUD/ffmay05.pdf. In answer to
his rhetorical question, "How can we fight fraud and develop more viable cases using the
resources already at our disposal?", he answered, "The best way is to start thinking of the
criminal prosecution from the onset." Id. at 2. Other advice for investigators includes the
reminder that "[d]ocumentary evidence can be a powerful tool in criminal cases. But keep in
mind that documents can also be used by the defense. The target and his attorney will see all
the documents that an investigator collects, including internal memos." Id. (emphasis
added). He concluded with the caution that "[flor evidence to assist in the prosecution of a
case it must tell a story that is consistent with the theory of the case. Photographs need to
show damage or lack thereof.... All of this evidence is a tool that will provide the
foundation for a criminal prosecution." Id.
151 Sociological research suggests that the common perception of civil juries' sympathy
to injured plaintiffs is incorrect, especially in the personal injury scenario. See Hans & Dee,
supra note 26, at 1097. Particularly regarding soft-tissue claims, the researchers found jurors
likely to question the credibility of the claimant, with significant results to the amount
awarded. See id. at 1099 ("A scenario experiment in a national poll conducted by Hans and
Nicole Vadino varied according to whether a hypothetical plaintiff in an accident
experienced a broken bone or a connective tissue injury, both of which a doctor confirmed.
Respondents were significantly more likely to believe plaintiff claims of the broken bone.
They saw the broken bone as more serious than the connective tissue injury, even though the
consequences of the injury were held constant.").
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already-deep suspicion of soft tissue injuries 15 2 may now result in criminal
investigation. 53 Awareness of these criteria, or even awareness of frequent
insurance fraud prosecutions, forces the family to include the potential for
criminal investigation alongside the denial of claim benefits when
determining whether to go forward on a contested claim. Under such
circumstances, they might well decide not to file a claim at all, thus
relieving the insurance company of its promise to pay made in exchange for
collected premiums. In the wake of a highly publicized Long Island
indictment, Professor Evan Schwartz described the potential effect as
follows: "There will be good people swept up in these indictments and it
will have a seriously chilling effect on the number of no-fault claims, which
improves the bottom line of these companies,
and a lot of people who need
154
it.'
get
won't
treatment,
[medical]
Moreover, the fact that the NICB's list of fraud indicators includes
early retention of legal representation is particularly ominous. If early
retention of an attorney is viewed as a manifestation of fraud, then
policyholders will not only be deterred from filing claims but also from
obtaining counsel to represent them on the claims they do file. This
secondary deterrent has the potential to greatly advantage insurance
companies in the claims adjustment process.
In cases where claimants fail to retain counsel, insurance adjusters are
able to settle claims for a fraction of their true value. 55 Claimants are often
unaware of the full extent of the benefits contained in their policies, and
may not be able to marshal their medical records and make an adequate
presentation of their prognosis and future treatment needs. In contrast, an
experienced plaintiffs' attorney has both the skills and resources to assess
156
the full extent of the claimant's loss and negotiate a larger settlement.
Hence, if insurance carriers can discourage injured policyholders from

152 See

Drew Griffin & Kathleen Johnston, Auto InsurersPlay Hardballin Minor-Crash

Claims, CNN.COM (Feb. 9, 2007), http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/02/09/insurance.hardball/
index.html.
153The fact that a claim is denied by an insurance company does not mean that the claim
was meritless, let alone fraudulent. A recent report profiled by the New York Post revealed
that health insurance companies wrongly denied coverage to ill patients in half the cases
reviewed by an outside panel of doctors. See Susan Edelman, InsurerDoom Machine, N.Y.
POST, July 8, 2007, at 6, available at http://www.nypost.com/seven/07082007/news/
regionalnews/insurer doom_machine-regionalnews susanedelman.htm?page=0.
154 Robin Topping, DA Finds Lawyers In Middle of Scam, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Aug. 20,
2003, at A20.
155See discussion of attorney representation infra Part III.B.
156Id.
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retaining counsel, 157
they stand to significantly benefit in terms of reduced
claim settlements.
There have already been documented instances of insurance companies
using ethically dubious tactics to prevent claimants from retaining
attorneys. In 1994, for example, Allstate began distributing a controversial
flyer entitled Do I Need an Attorney? to policyholders who filed accident
reports. 158 The flyer suggested financial benefits to those who did not retain
counsel. 159 The campaign succeeded in reducing the number of claimants
who hired attorneys by more than 10%160 before being halted by regulators
in several states.' 6' Since then, according to documents produced in
connection with a bad-faith action, Allstate has made a deliberate internal
switch from a "good hands" to "boxing gloves" policy when handling
represented claims. According to a report by CNN, a company insider
stated that management consultant company McKinsey suggested Allstate
put on "boxing gloves" when handling represented claims and engage in a
"three-D" strategy: deny the claim, delay the settlement, and defend in
court. 162
According to Business Week, the consultants even included a
157

Id.

158

See Unauthorized Practice of Law Complaint v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 001-97 (W. Va.

State Bar Comm. on Unlawful Practice Sept. 22,
1997), available at
http://www.wvbar.org/barinfo/announce/Haden.pdf.
The West Virginia State Bar
Committee on Unlawful Practice concluded:
In reality, the Allstate document, when read as a whole, is clearly and unequivocally an attempt
by Allstate to convince individuals to not hire an attorney but, instead, deal directly with Allstate.
The document is further an attempt by Allstate to convince individuals who have been injured by
an Allstate insured that they will be able to obtain larger and faster settlements if they do not
retain counsel.
Id. at 7.
159See Opinion Letter of Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, Sept. 28,
1998, available at http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=1770&Q=281700 ("We believe
that an objectively reasonable person would conclude that the flyer, read as a whole, 'advises
against the need for or discourages the retention of' an attorney. In fact, an objectively
reasonable person could conclude that the avoidance of attorneys was the flyer's sole
intent.") (emphasis added); see also Angela Wissman, Before You Decide to See an
Attorney... ,ILL. LEGAL TIMES, June 1999, at 1 ("Since at least 1994 Allstate Insurance Co.
has carried out a nationwide strategy to keep people injured by their insureds away from
attorneys, say plaintiffs' attorneys and consumer advocates.
The strategy included
contacting claimants soon after the accident, sending them written documents with Allstate's
pledge to treat them like a 'customer' and providing information about the costs of hiring an
attorney.").
160 See Brigid McMenamin, A Holy War, FORBES, June 16, 1997, at 48.
161 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. West Virginia State Bar, 233 F.3d 813, 815 (4th Cir. 2000)
("On September 22, 1997, the full [state bar] committee issued its written opinion and
decision that Allstate's dissemination of the pamphlet constituted the unauthorized practice
of law.").
162 See Griffin & Johnston, supra note 152.
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forecast on the amount of stock price appreciation available from reduced
attorney representation, predicting that a 25% reduction in attorneyrepresented claims in certain categories could add $1.60 to each share of
Allstate stock.1 63 Given such documented1 64 hostility to policyholders who

are represented by counsel, and given the NICB's inclusion of claimants
who "retain legal representation immediately" on its list of suspect
indicators of fraud, it is entirely plausible that unethical carriers who have
an effective alliance with prosecutors would single out counseled claims for
aggressive investigation and referral for prosecution.
Even more
importantly, it is entirely plausible for the plaintiffs' bar to perceive that
being the case and subsequently restrict their choice of clients to avoid such
a risk.
C. CHILLING THE PLAINTIFFS' BAR
Hence, in cases where policyholders retain counsel, another and
possibly even greater potential chilling effect exists. Personal injury
attorneys may become unwilling to take cases. This chilling effect on
attorneys, just as with claimants, is twofold. In addition to the potential
reluctance to accept cases, lawyers may experience inhibition in
negotiating, advocating, and settling on behalf of their clients.
The Association of Trial Lawyers of America ("ATLA"), in its amicus
curiae brief in Ellis,165 argues that trial lawyers could perceive criminal
prosecutions brought under an Alliance system as a method of intimidation:
The ability to influence the investigation and prosecution of individuals raises the
potential abuse of [the] power to "punish" an attorney who has been particularly
successful against an insurer or to exert pressure on an attorney or client to withdraw
or reduce a liability claim. Similarly, the6otential exists for targeting individuals who
oppose the insurers' legislative position.

As the ATLA amici noted, the actual intent of the prosecution in such
system is nearly secondary in importance to a perception of persecution and
manipulation. According to ATLA, the public will feel that the lawyers
were targeted for opposing industry interests:
Regardless of whether a particular investigation or prosecution is actually motivated
by such considerations, when an attorney who has opposed an insurer is targeted, the
163 See

Orey, supra note 21.

The relative frequency of news stories trumpeting insurance company antipathy to
represented claimants leads credence to the proposition that average policyholders are aware
of the risks retaining counsel might pose to an expeditious resolution of their insurance
claims. However, the pervasiveness of this understanding would best be served by empirical
research currently unavailable.
165 Commonwealth v. Ellis, 708 N.E.2d 644 (Mass. 1999).
166 ATLA Brief, supra note 22, at *4.
164
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public perception that167the criminal justice system is being manipulated by private
interests is inevitable.

Moreover, in such a system, it is extremely difficult for outside
observers to differentiate between a prosecution brought in good faith in
order to punish insurance168fraud and a prosecution brought in bad faith to
punish zealous advocacy.
The potential of becoming the target of a criminal prosecution will
undoubtedly affect an attorney's actions in a variety of different ways.
When the prosecution commences a grand jury investigation, they often
subpoena a law firm's or single practitioner's records of clients suspected of
participating in fraudulent behavior. Knowing that the standard for
obtaining a subpoena is low, 16 9 a lawyer may restrict his interaction with his
client so as to maintain case files for his own future defense.170 Most likely,
lawyers would simply restrict the scope of actions likely to trigger
insurance company scrutiny, so as to avoid coming to their attention at all.
D. STATE V. MARK MARKS, P.A.: THE PROSECUTION OF LITIGATION
TACTICS AS FRAUD
To understand the full effect even an initial investigation of insurance
fraud can have on a law firm, it is necessary to understand how such cases
typically work in practice. A particularly stark example of the implications
inherent to attorney prosecution is the Florida case of State v. Mark Marks,
P.A. 17 ' The gravamen of the prosecution in Marks was the insurance
industry's dissatisfaction with plaintiffs' attorneys who, in their view,
withheld unfavorable medical information during pre-settlement
negotiations. The prosecution regarded anything short of absolute candor
167
168

Id. at 4-5 (emphasis added).
The majority of prosecutorial decision-making is discretionary and beyond the scope

of review by either courts or the public. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 703.
169 Hirschfeld v. City of New York, 253 A.D. 2d 53, 58 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) ("When the
district attorney, on his own initiative, issues and serves ... a subpoena in good faith, a
proceeding is instituted in the grand jury, just as, in an analogous situation, a civil action is
commenced by the service of a summons. There is no requirement that the people open a
grand jury proceeding, prior to the return date of a grand jury subpoena, or that the
subpoena's validity depends on the existence of a particular grand jury at any specific time.
What is required is that the grand jury be convened... on the return date of the subpoena so
that the witness has access, if he chooses, to prompt judicial resolution of any challenge to
the scope or propriety of his examination.") (citations omitted).
170 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2008) ("A lawyer shall not counsel a
client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent,
but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposedcourse of conduct with a
client and may counsel or assista client to make a goodfaith effort to determine the validity,
scope, meaningor applicationof the law.") (emphasis added).
171 State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1997).

AN UNHOLYALLIANCE

2008]

on the part of plaintiffs' attorneys as tantamount to
fraud, 172 regardless of
73
the existence of governing rules of civil discovery.'
On March 10, 1989, led by Florida Insurance Commissioner Tom
Gallagher, 174 investigators from the Florida Insurance Department staged a
dramatic, high-profile raid on the North Miami and other offices of Mark
176
Marks, P.A. 175 The raid culminated in the seizure of 253 client files
including "correspondence, doctors' reports, medical bills and financial
records."' 177 The state bar association then petitioned for an immediate

172 See

Cross-Reply Brief of Marvin Marks at 1, State v. Mark Marks, P.A., No. 85,920,

1995 WL 17016002 (Fla. Nov. 17, 1995). The brief gives a synopsis of the trial transcripts
as follows:
The Court: Well, do you think that they have to hand in a report that says someone is only two
percent disabled when five reports say he is 45 percent disabled?
[The Prosecutor]: Absolutely. If it's not privileged and it's relevant and material to the claim.
The Court: What if it's one of four doctors' reports where one finds a two percent and the others
45?

[The Prosecutor]: If those are treating physicians where there is no question about privilege I
think that it's incomplete and fraudulent to exclude those.
Id. (emphasis in original).
173The Florida Appellate District Court did recognize that the rules of civil discovery
might be relevant to the determination of the nature of the "incomplete" claim subject to
fraud prosecution by statute:
Attorneys are guided by numerous different rules, laws, and cases dealing with the atypical
obligations of an attorney in an advocate role. Attorneys and their clients enjoy a confidential
relationship, which includes constraints upon information that can be disclosed to others. Once a
suit is initiated, rules of discovery provide for an exchange of information between adversaries.
Even then, some items do not have to be disclosed to an adversary absent special findings by a
trial court. Specifically, the identities and/or opinions of a non-witness work product expert are
not discoverable absent a showing of exceptional circumstances under rule 1.280(b)(4)(B).
Medical reports based on an examination requested by a party do not need to be delivered absent
a request for such. In personal injury protection claims, a party must turn over all medical
records concerning a specific condition only after requesting and receiving a copy of medical
reports from a medical examination requested by the insurer. Finally, the confidentiality of
medical records is statutorily protected from disclosure in most circumstances until a proper
subpoena has been issued.

Marks, 654 So. 2d at 1187 (internal citations omitted).
174 Mr. Gallagher was a candidate for Governor at the time of the raid and gave a press
conference concerning this case in front of the Marks law office. See Answer Brief of
Respondent at 8, State v. Mark Marks, P.A., No. 85,920, 1995 WL 17016464 (Fla. Sept. 19,
1995).
175See Joe Starita & Fred Grimm, Law Firm's Records Seized, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 11,
1989, at 1-1.
176 See Marks, 698 So. 2d at 535.
177Id.; Starita & Grimm, supra note 175.
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suspension of the Marks firm attorneys from the practice of law.178 By
March 14, the Florida Supreme Court had suspended the firm's principal
79
attorneys Marvin Mark Marks and his son Gary from the practice of law. 1
Within months, the state attorney general's office sought to confiscate and
shutter the firm's law office under the forfeiture provisions of Florida's
version of the Racketeer-Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"). 180
On December 22, the attorney general's office and the insurance
department jointly announced a thirty-two-count indictment 81 against the
Marks firm, three of its attorneys, and two doctors who often performed
medical examinations of the firm's clients. 182 The charges included state
criminal RICO violations, insurance fraud, grand larceny, and perjury. If
convicted, Marvin Marks, age fifty-four, faced up to one hundred years in
jail for the twenty-six criminal counts lodged against him. 83 Press
coverage touted the raid as the culmination "of the most extensive criminal
' 84
investigations ever [conducted] by the Florida Department of Insurance."'
The state insurance commissioner accused the defendants of perpetrating an
"outrageous ... criminal conspiracy in which attorneys.., set up an
operation designed to cheat insurance companies out of millions of
' 185
dollars."
The indictment against Marks and his firm focused on the tactics used
during pre-settlement negotiations. In particular, the firm was accused of
concealing unfavorable medical reports in an attempt to achieve enhanced
settlement of no-fault insurance claims. The prosecution contended 186 that
178 See Joe Starita, Court Suspends Mark Marks Law Practice,MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 14,

1989, at 1-1.
179 Id.

180 See Joe Starita, State Seeks Seizure of Lawyer's Office, Using Rackets Law, MIAMI
HERALD, Sept. 13, 1989, at 1-1.
18 See Gallagher Announces Arrests Today in Mark Marks Fraud Operation, PR

NEWSWiRE, Dec. 22, 1989 [hereinafter Gallagher]; see also David Conn, Fla. DoctorLawyer Ring Indictedfor Theft, Fraud,J. OF COMMERCE, Dec. 26, 1989, at 9A.
182Gallagher,supra note 181; see also State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So. 2d 533, 535

(Fla. 1997).
183 See Conn, supra note 181, at 9A.

184 Gallagher,supra note 181.
185 Id.

186See Marks, 698 So. 2d at 535:
In summary, the information charged the eight defendants with engaging in various illegal
activities including but not limited to:
Preparation and submission of false and fraudulent medical tests and procedures for the
purpose of enhancing the settlement value of insurance claims;
Soliciting clients to undergo unnecessary and dangerous medical tests and procedures for the
purpose of enhancing the settlement value of insurance claims;
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submissions to the insurance carriers that did not include all available
medical information constituted an "incomplete" claim, which, when
coupled with an intent to defraud, was an impermissible fraudulent
concealment, the making of which violated recently 1enacted
Section
87
817.234 of the Florida General Statutes on insurance fraud.
The attorney general's office likely viewed the Marks prosecution as a
test case of the insurance fraud statute, which had only recently been
enacted. The broadly worded statute not only contained a vague provision
criminalizing deceptive "incomplete" claims, 88 but also included a section
that specifically penalized attorneys. 189 In particular, the statute provided
that "any attorney who knowingly and willfully assists, conspires with, or
urges any claimant to fraudulently violate any of the provisions of this
section... or any person who, due to such assistance, conspiracy, or urging
on such attorney's part, knowingly and willfully benefits from the proceeds
derived from the use of such fraud, commits insurance fraud."' 9° Notably,
no similar legislation was enacted to punish fraud by insurance carriers or
their employees.' 9'
Altering, forging and concealing medical reports, medical test results and medical bills to
enhance the settlement value of insurance claims;
Subornation of false, fraudulent and perjured testimony by clients and other witnesses
regarding material matters in order to enhance the settlement value of insurance claims; and
Theft of monies from various insurance companies by means of the foregoing acts.

Many of the charges were based on actions undertaken by the lawyers in the course of their
representation. See id. ("A large number of the counts in both informations were based on
the attorneys' actions in representing various clients in insurance claims during pre-suit
settlement negotiations.").
187Id. at 535-36; see also State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 654 So. 2d 1184, 1189 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1995) ("As far as can be ascertained, the state can not specifically identify when an
omission of information by an attorney in an adversarial context is fraudulent, other than to
say that an omission is fraudulent when there is an intent to defraud.").
188FLA. STAT. § 817.234(1) (1987) provided in pertinent parts:
[Any person who,] with the intent to injure, defraud or deceive any insurer: ...(2)Prepares or
makes any written or oral statement that is intended to be presented to any insurance company in
connection with, or in support of, any claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an
insurance policy... knowing that such statement contains any false, incomplete, or misleading
information concerning any fact or thing material to such claim... is guilty of a felony in the
third degree.

(emphasis added).
§ 817.234(3)(3).
190FLA. STAT. § 817.234(3)(4). The statute also references fraudulent violations of Part
189See FLA. STAT.

XI of Chapter 627 of the Florida statutes as inclusive to a violation of Fla. Stat. § 817.234
(3).
191In response to Marks's equal protection argument addressing the absence of insurance
companies from the insurance fraud statute, the prosecution in part argued that civil and
regulatory remedies were sufficient with regards to the insurance companies.

400
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During the early stages of the case, the prosecution contended that
attorneys had both an ethical and legal duty of absolute candor in
conducting settlement negotiations. Part of this obligation included an
affirmative duty to disclose all information "arguably material" to the
insurance claim in the lawyer's pre-suit "offer to settle" letter, 92 or the letter
was to be considered fraudulently incomplete. 93
The prosecution
maintained that this was the standard even in a situation where four doctors
had certified the client as 45% disabled and only one doctor had found her
disability to be minor.' 94 In essence, the prosecution contended that
attorneys conducting pre-lawsuit' 95 settlement negotiations with insurers
were required, on pain of prosecution, to provide the carriers with the
equivalent of full civil discovery'9 6 and to undermine their own clients'
claims, despite the adversarial nature of the proceeding.
It is interesting to note, however, that neither the prosecution nor the
insurance department regarded this duty to disclose as reciprocal. During
discovery, it was revealed that in one of the underlying cases, the insurance

[C]laimants and insurance companies occupy substantially different legal provisions. Insurance
companies are heavily regulated by the State. Unfair trade practices and unfair settlement
practices are prohibited. Fraudulent acts by insurers could result in the loss of licenses to
conduct business in the State. If insurers fail to settle a legitimate claim, they can be held liable
for excess verdicts for bad faith.
Reply Brief of Petitioner at 14, State v. Mark Marks, P.A., No. 85,920, 1995 WL 17016004
(Fla. Oct. 16, 1995). They even contended that "claimants and their attorneys are not subject
to these regulations." Id. The fact that lawyers are a similarly regulated group subject to
similar and extensive civil and regulatory sanctions for fraudulent conduct was not
discussed.
192The lower court found that the fraud statute created no such affirmative duty of
disclosure. See Marks, 654 So. 2d at 1184.
193 Answer Brief of Respondent, supra note 174, at 8.
194 id.

195 Defendant Marks in his answer stated that after initiation of suit, in response to
subpoena, the reports underlying the alleged fraudulent omission were disclosed. Amended
Answer Brief of Mark Marks at 5, No. 85,920, 1995 WL 17016463 (Fla. Sept. 25, 1995)
("When the rules of discovery became operable, all reports were provided.").
196 The Supreme Court of Florida in its review of the statute for vagueness
recognized
that many of the rules of disclosure are governed by existing rules of civil procedure. See
State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So. 2d 533, 538 (Fla. 1997) ("Once a suit is initiated, rules of
discovery provide for an exchange of information between adversaries. Even then, some
items do not have to be disclosed to an adversary absent special finding by a trial court.
Specifically, the identities and/or opinions of a non-witness work product expert are not
discoverable absent a showing of exceptional circumstances .... In personal injury
protection claims, a party must turn over all medical records concerning a specific condition
only after requesting and receiving a copy of medical reports from a medical examination
requested by the insurer .... [T]he confidentiality of medical records is statutorily protected
from disclosure in most circumstances until a proper subpoena has been issued.") (internal
citations omitted).
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company had concealed a report prepared by its adjuster suggesting that the
gas station owner who had allegedly caused the injury was negligent.' 97
When this was brought to the attention of the
prosecutor, he declined to file
198
charges against the carrier or its employees.
The trial court dismissed many of the insurance fraud charges on the
theory that the statute was unconstitutionally vague as to what would
constitute fraudulently "incomplete" insurance claims, given the nature of
the attorney-client relationship. 99 The Florida Supreme Court upheld the
dismissal of these charges in part because they recognized that an attorney
has a special role in society, that of an advocate. They explained that
it is an attorney's unique obligations [sic] when viewed in conjunction with the term
"incomplete" that renders this particular statute vague as applied to attorneys
[b]ecause attorneys, pursuant to statute, case law, procedural rules, and rules of
professional regulation, are customarily required to withhold certain types of
information throughout the representation.2 00

The Court recognized that the "unique obligation" of the lawyer and
the nature of legal representation encompasses "less than complete
disclosure" and is "considered acceptable practice. 2 0 ' The Court noted that
the statute did not "indicate, in terms that a person of common intelligence
would understand, in what instances less than complete disclosure by an
attorney becomes a criminal offense.2 0 2
Consequently, the Court
concluded the statute was void for vagueness since it did20"not
provide
°3
adequate notice of the conduct by attorneys that it proscribes.
Upon remand, the trial court dismissed the remaining charges against
the Mark Marks firm due to "egregious" and "substantial" ex parte
communications made by the prosecution to a judge who was later
disqualified.20 4 The Florida Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. 0 5
Significantly, while affirming the decision on due process grounds, the
appellate court based its decision not only on the unfairness of the ex parte
conduct but also on the unique role of attorneys as advocates for their
clients:

197
198

Amended Answer Brief of Mark Marks, supra note 195, at 6-7.

Id.

199 See Marks, 698 So. 2d at 537 ("The court found that as applied to attorneys
representing their clients, the statute failed to provide sufficient notice and was susceptible to
arbitrary enforcement.").
200 Id.
201 Id. at 538.
202

Id.

203

Id.
State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 758 So. 2d 1131, 1134 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 1137.

204
205
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It is thus possible to advocate a very close case, one where the issue of negligence is
cloudy or injuries are not indisputably related to the injury, yet not misrepresent
anything to the insurer. In this circumstance, counsel can lawfully seek to advocate
the client's position to achieve the maximum recovery available. Again we stress,
counsel cannot commit a fraud on the insurer by misrepresenting facts counsel knows
to be untrue.
The problem is locating the demarcation between acceptable
advocacy-a tolerable adversarial, hyperbolic presentation of inferences, implications
and conclusions about symptoms, causes and effects-and unacceptable fraud by
outright lying. The point at which advocacy passes from the one to the other may
well be exceedingly
beclouded in a given case, as where the facts point in both
20 6
directions.

In 2002, the Florida Supreme Court denied a review of the Court of
Appeals' decision, finally bringing the Marks prosecution to an end. By
that time, the firm and the indicted attorney-defendants had spent thirteen
years and millions of dollars in an effort to stay out of jail.20 7 Although a
court ultimately awarded them partial recovery of their legal fees,20 8 their
reputations had been irreparably tarnished and the Marks firm was unable to
reopen. Although one can argue that the Marks firm and its lawyers
ultimately won, a foreboding message had been sent to other Florida
personal injury attorneys that state prosecutors were prepared to regulate
insurance claim litigation practices through criminal prosecution.
In some ways, it matters little whether prosecutions such as Marks's
result in the ultimate vindication of the indicted attorneys. Even if
prosecutions based on litigation practices do not result in convictions, the
harm suffered by attorneys and law firms is incalculable both in terms of
financial loss and loss of reputations. A rational lawyer would likely go a
long way to avoid this type of scrutiny. This may include stepping away
from overly zealous settlement negotiations and substantially lowering the
settlement amount that had heretofore been justifiably sought. Lawyerclient relationships are disrupted because a lawyer, whose fiduciary duty is
.to his client, must now ascertain whether or not his performance will incur
the ire of his insurance adversary and result in his referral for criminal
prosecution. If such considerations by attorneys become systemic, the
practice of personal injury law will be substantially restricted since lawyers
will be less likely to aggressively litigate or pursue novel causes of action
on behalf of clients. The net effect is that injured persons, particularly the
poor, lose some portion of their access to the legal system.

206 Id. at 1136.
207

Marks v. Dep't of Legal Affairs, 937 So. 2d 1211, 1213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).

208

Id.
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IV. PRESERVING THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM: PROTECTING THE
PLAINTIFFS' BAR AND INSURANCE CLAIMANTS FROM THE ALLIANCE'S
CHILL
A. DUE PROCESS AND EQUITY CONCERNS: THE NEED FOR
SAFEGUARDS

In its most rational reduction, the argument for using funds assessed
from an industry to finance the investigation and prosecution of crimes
against that industry's interests is based on the concept that such funding
advances society's interest to the extent that those prosecutions had been
foregone solely due to a lack of funds. 20 9 As such, providing a mechanism

for funding is a public good as it allows for the prosecution of these crimes
and the punishment of the guilty. 210 The infusion of a payer independent

from the state's general revenues, however, requires, at a minimum,
recognition of the potential for improper conflicting interests influencing
the prosecutor's discretion.2 1'
Moreover, the Alliance structures as implemented by various states,
described above, are not even simple funding mechanisms. They come
with restrictions on use, creations of special bureaus, and formalized

institutional engagenient between the prosecutor's offices, investigators
(public, private, and "quasi-public"), and the funding industry (both as the
victim and as a trade group). These structures have also led to perceptions
of conflict. Therefore, it behooves us to further explore the constitutional

considerations implicated by these processes in recognition of their relative
recentness of inclusion in the criminal justice process.
1. ConflictingInterests and Their Due Process Implicationsfor Prosecutors

It is fairly well accepted 21 2 that prosecutors must be, at least in some
sense, impartial in their pursuit of justice.21 3

This unique responsibility,

209 See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 704.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 698.

212 Delineating the exact nature of the impartial prosecutor has been a favorite
preoccupation of the courts. See Wright v. United States, 732 F.2d 1048, 1056 (2d Cir.
1984) ("It is a bit easier to say what a disinterested prosecutor is not than what he is."). It
has also been the subject of much excellent scholarship. See, e.g., Green & Zacharias, supra
note 10, at 850; Zacharias, Can ProsecutorsDo Justice?,supra note 104, at 57.
213 The idea of the impartial prosecutor is linked to the requirement of a fair trial. See
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (describing the role of the prosecutor in the
context of his representation of the governing people); Jones v. Richards, 776 F.2d 1244,
1247 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting that a criminal defendant is entitled "to an impartial prosecutor,
who can make an unbiased use of all options available"); People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310,
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which sets prosecutors apart from all other attorneys laboring within our
adversarial system, was recognized by courts as early as 1935. In Berger v.
United States,2 14 the Supreme Court articulated the often-quoted principle
that the state's "interest ...in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win
a case, but that justice shall be done., 215 Accordingly, a prosecutor "isin a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law," and "[it] is as much
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just
one." 2 16 Thus, the Court identifies within our system of laws a unique role
and responsibility for the prosecutor because "[tihe United States Attorney
is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all. 2 17
To say that there is a requirement of an impartial prosecutor is not to
say that the prosecutor does not have immense discretion in the undertaking
of his duties, 218 nor that he is not entitled to prosecute his action with
zeal.219 In no area is his discretion greater, for instance, than in the
determination of whom to charge and how to conduct the case. 220 In fact,
315 (Cal. 1996) (noting "the nature of the impartiality required of the public prosecutor
follows from the prosecutor's role as a representative of the People as a body, rather than as
individuals"); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2008) ("[A] prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister ofjustice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility
carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice.").
In Massachusetts, the Ellis Court likewise did not dispute that the insurance fraud defendants
had a right to "a fair trial, conducted by an impartial, disinterested prosecutor."
Commonwealth v. Ellis, 8 Mass. L. Rptr. 678, at *11 (Super. Ct. 1998).
214

295 U.S. at 78.

215
216

Zacharias, Can ProsecutorsDo Justice?, supra note 104, at 88.
Id.

217

Berger,295 U.S. at 78.

218

The Supreme Court has granted great deference as to a prosecutor's determination of

whom to prosecute. See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (identifying
the obligation of deference "to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute" in the
normal course). This discretion is, of course, bound by the requirement that the prosecutor
must have "probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by
statute." See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
219 See Green & Zacharias, supra note 10, at 850-52.
220 Generally, a motion for dismissal based on a claim of selective prosecution is the only
mechanism whereby a defendant may challenge a charging determination. See Rumery, 480
U.S. at 396; Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1981) (stating that charging is within
prosecutor's discretion alone). But see In re Justices of the Super. Ct. Dep't of the Mass.
Trial Ct., 218 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2000) (entertaining the notion of habeas relief). Nor is there
a procedural mechanism by which a private citizen can challenge a prosecutor's refusal to
bring charges against another. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)
(finding no judicially cognizable interest of an individual person in the prosecution of
another).
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the courts are generally so deferential to this exercise of discretion that the
only real check on prosecutors' power is the motion to dismiss based on the
claim of selective prosecution, which is both extraordinarily limited in its
scope and in its chances for success.221
Such remarkable deference to prosecutorial discretion, however, can
be seen as justified only in relation to the prosecutor's appropriate
independence.222
Traditionally, prosecutorial independence inherently
relies on the prosecutor's freedom from impermissible conflicts.22 3 In the
event of identification of such an impermissible conflict, disqualification of
the prosecutor is a potential remedy.224 Thus, while selective prosecution
motions struggle under a relatively high burden, the courts seem more
willing to support the disqualification of a conflicted prosecutor.22 5
In any event, courts have looked to the ethical conflict rules to assist in
their determination of improper prosecutorial conduct. The leading
Supreme Court precedent on point is Young v. United States ex. reL Louis
Vuitton et Fils S.A.,226 which considered the allowability of appointing
private attorneys to prosecute a criminal contempt proceeding when those
attorneys also represented the civil plaintiff who would benefit from the
contempt proceeding.2 27 This was a true "private prosecutor" case, where
the district court had appointed the civil plaintiffs lawyers as special

221

Claims of selective prosecution require a showing not only of discriminatory effect in

charging determinations, but also that the charge was deliberately based on an unjustifiable
standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. See United States v. Wayte,
470 U.S. 598, 608-10 (1985); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). Discriminatory
purpose is a high burden to meet, and has been held to imply "more than ... awareness of
consequences. It implies that the decision-maker... selected or reaffirmed a particular
course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon
an identifiable group." Wayne, 470 U.S. at 610; see also Kennedy, supra note 8, at 667-78
(discussing selective prosecution motions and finding them to "require a virtual admission of
discriminatory intent on the part of the prosecutorial agency").
222 Prosecutorial freedom of action can be seen as supported by a parallel freedom from
influence. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 679 (characterizing trust in prosecutorial discretion
as predicated on independence from any discrete private or governmental interest).
223

Id.

224 See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (disqualification of a
prosecutor warranted due to personal interest). Penal codes may also incorporate the ability
to disqualify a prosecutor for conflicts of interest. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1424 (West
2007) (stating that disqualification may be granted if the evidence shows that a conflict of
interests exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial).
225 Bordenkircher,434 U.S. 357.
226 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
227 The Young review arose from a challenge to a criminal contempt action brought for
violation of a civil injunction prohibiting the making of counterfeit products by the civil
defendant. Id. at 789-90.
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2 The Supreme Court
counsel to prosecute the criminal contempt action .228
held that "counsel for a party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not
be appointed
to undertake contempt prosecutions for alleged violations of
2 29

that order.,

While declining to embrace a per se rule prohibiting all private
prosecutorial involvement in criminal cases, the Young Court recognized
both the importance of potential conflicts of interests on the role of the
prosecutor and the continued relevance of even the appearance of
impropriety.
The Court explained that regardless of whether the
appointment of private counsel in that case had resulted in any actual
prosecutorial impropriety, an issue on which they gave no opinion, that
such an "appointment illustrates the potential for private interest to
influence the discharge of public duty. '230 Further, the court identified the
ability of the criminal contempt case to act as improper leverage on the
other party in the resolution of their other civil claims:
These claims theoretically could have created temptation to use the criminal
investigation to gather information of use in those suits, and could have served as
bargaining leverage in obtaining pleas in the criminal prosecution. In short, as will
generally be the case, the appointment of counsel for an interested party to bring the
contempt prosecution in this case at a minimum created opportunities for conflicts to
arise, and created at least the appearanceof impropriety.

Many of the Justices were well aware of the extreme disadvantage to
the defendant which results from the appointment of an interested
prosecutor. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens, noted in concurrence that "[w]e have held that some errors 'are so
228

Id. at 791.

229

Id. at 790. Young is a particularly difficult case to parse as a result of the numerous

different points of concurrence and dissent among the justices. The majority agreed that
private attorneys may not prosecute contempt charges when their client is a beneficiary of
that court order. Id. at 790. However, the justices split on the issue of the appropriate
remedy for that violation; Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, was joined by Justices
Stevens, Marshall, and Blackmun in concluding the error as sufficiently fundamental so as to
require a per se reversal. Id. at 809-14. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice O'Connor, dissented from both the judgment and the fundamental error analysis,
concluding that the case should have been remanded for a determination on the appointment
as under harmless error analysis. See id. at 825-27. It was only as a result of Justice Scalia's
separate concurring opinion that per se reversal was granted. Id. at 815. This concurrence,
however, was grounded in his opinion that the appointment of a contempt prosecutor by a
federal district court constituted a violation of the separation of powers between the judiciary
and the executive branch. Id. at 815.
230Young, 481 U.S. at 805. A conflict of interest can also be seen to effect objectivity.
See Vasquez v. Hillary, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) (noting that prosecution by an attorney
with conflicting interests "calls into question the objectivity of those charged with bringing a
defendant to judgment").
231 Young, 481 U.S. at 806.
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fundamental and pervasive that they require reversal without regard to the
facts or circumstances of the particular case.',, 232 Those Justices then
concluded
"that the appointment of an interested prosecutor is such an
233
error."
The Young decision is also useful in helping us distinguish between
two types of interests that are often conjoined when discussing
prosecutorial neutrality. The majority reiterated the distinction between
finding an arrangement that creates an actual conflict of interest and finding
the existence of actual misconduct. They noted that "[a]n arrangement
represents an actual conflict of interest if its potential for misconduct is
deemed intolerable. The determination whether there is an actual conflict
of interest is therefore
distinct from the determination of whether there was
234
actual misconduct.,

The Court also appears to have sought to distinguish between two
distinct scenarios where a prosecutor's required impartiality may be
impaired-situations of overzealousness by the prosecutor and situations of
divided loyalty:
It is true that prosecutors may on occasion be overzealous and become overly
committed to obtaining conviction. That problem, however, is personal, not
structural ....[S]uch overzealousness "does not have its roots in a conflict of
interest. When it manifests itself the court deals with it on a case-by-case basis as an
aberration. This is quite different from approving a practice which would permit the
appointment of prosecutors whose undivided loyalty is pledged to a party interested
only in a conviction. 235

We can discern from Young that situations of impaired loyalty can be
seen to be substantially graver than the case of mere overzealousness.23 6 To
conclude that a relationship creates a structural "problem" is very close to
determining that it is the type of situation warranting the appellation of a

232 Id. at 809-10 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)).
233 Id. at 810.
234 Id. at 808 & n.18.
235 I.
236 Overzealousness can best be understood as focusing on the prosecutor's personal
motivations. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 683 (describing issues of overzealousness as
concerning threats to impartiality "posed by the prosecutor's own interests in the outcome of
the case") (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court's handling of the issue of zealousness
as a personal conflict is best illustrated by its analysis in Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238
(1980). In that case, the Court rejected a defendant's contention that the government agency
performing certain prosecutorial functions violated his due process rights as a result of their
interest in collecting the money penalties allowed under the statute. Id. at 251-52. The
Court noted that its due process evaluation might have been significantly different if the
alleged over-prosecution had singled out any specific groups. Id. at n. 12.
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"structural defect in the trial mechanism," and, as such, would support those
Justices who concurred in finding the appointment per se reversible.2 37
Although the Young decision rested on the Supreme Court's inherent
supervisory power and considerations of prosecutorial ethics rather than
constitutional due process, the Court often uses its supervisory authority to
strike down an unlawful procedure as a precursor to finding that such
practice amounts to a due process violation.23 8 The Tennessee courts,
construing the right to prosecutorial impartiality in light of Young, have
concluded that it "does not preclude and probably only foreshadows a
constitutional bar" with respect to the involvement of private prosecutors in
criminal cases.239
In subsequent cases, other courts interpreting Young have held that the
Due Process Clause mandates substantial restrictions on the activities of
private prosecutors.
The judicially imposed restrictions include
requirements that private attorneys work under the direction of public
prosecutors and that they not be permitted to "effectively control critical
prosecutorial decisions ...[such as] whether to prosecute, what targets of
prosecution to select, what investigative powers to utilize [and] what
sanctions to seek., 240 Other jurisdictions have held that private prosecutors
with certain interests, such as representing victims who also have civil

237See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991) (finding that "structural defects
in the trial mechanism... defy harmless error standards").
238See Bessler, supra note 90, at 572 (noting that, in United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 13
(1975), the Supreme Court exercised its supervisory power in reversing a conviction based
on a defendant's silence after being given Miranda warnings). A year after Hale, in Doyle v.
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the Court enshrined the right to remain silent as a due process
right. Similarly, in Offutt v. United States, 388 U.S. 11 (1954), the Supreme Court, pursuant
to its supervisory authority, reversed a criminal contempt conviction because of judicial bias.
Subsequently, in In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), the Supreme Court ruled that
conducting a criminal contempt trial before a personally affronted judge violated due
process. For a general discussion of the Court's supervisory power, see Aviva Abramovsky,
Traitors in Our Midst: Attorneys Wo Inform on Their Clients, 2 U. PA. J. CONST'L L. 676,
703-05 (2000).
239See State v. Eldridge, 951 S.W.2d 775, 782 (Tenn. App. 1997) (citing Bessler, supra
note 90, at 571). Indeed, other commentators have simply described the decision as
essentially employing a due process analysis while using supervisory authority. See
Kennedy, supra note 8, at 681-82.
240 See Erikson v. Pawnee County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 263 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th
Cir. 2001); see also Stumbo v. Seabold, 704 F.2d 910, 911 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding that
Kentucky law allowing private prosecutors to assist in litigating criminal cases did not create
a per se due process violation because the statute required public prosecutors to retain full
control of the trial); State v. Imperiale, 773 F. Supp. 747, 750-51 (D.N.J. 1991) (finding that
use of private prosecutors implicates a defendant's "due process right to a fundamentally fair
trial" and that a town attorney with potential civil interests in the outcome of the criminal
proceeding was disqualified from acting as prosecutor).
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claims against the defendant, are disqualified per se from taking part in the
criminal litigation.24' Moreover, Justice Blackmun, concurring in Young,
simply concluded that the private prosecution in that case was "a violation
of due process., 242 He further stated that due process "requires a
disinterested prosecutor with the unique responsibility to serve the public,
rather than a private client, and to seek justice that is unfettered. 24 3
The progeny of Young generally pertain to direct participation of
private prosecutors in the criminal justice system, with a concomitant
review of their personal loyalty or financial interests, rather than indirect
funding of public prosecutors by private financial benefactors.24 4 The nonexistence of a formalized attorney-client relationship, however, does not
preclude the arising of conflicts of interest; nor is the interest or obligation
causing a conflict necessarily restricted to an individual, rather than
institutional, analysis.24 5 The Supreme Court of California, determining the
propriety of a prosecutorial disqualification under their state's recusal
statute, has already recognized that the "tie that binds the prosecutor to an
interested person may be compelling though it derives from the
prosecutor's institutional objectives or obligations. 24 6 The need for a
prosecutor free from the potential conflict of loyalties implicated by these
Alliance systems seems sufficient to mitigate in favor of a broadening of
the due process protections afforded a criminal defendant by many states in
the conflicted private prosecutor scenario.
As Justice Frankfurter
expressed, due process is a living doctrine:
Due process is not confined in its scope to the particular forms in which rights have
heretofore been found to have been curtailed for want of procedural fairness. Due
process is perhaps the most majestic concept in our whole constitutional system.
While it contains the garnered wisdom of the past
assuring fundamental justice, it is
• in 247
also a living principle not confined to past instances.

241

See, e.g., Cantrell v. State, 329 S.E.2d 22, 26 (Va. 1985) (finding a per se due process

violation where "the position of a private prosecutor having a civil interest in the
case... infects the prosecution with the possibility that private vengeance has been
substituted for impartial application of the criminal law").
242 481 U.S. 787, 815 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
243 Id.
244 But see People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 319-320 (Cal. 1996) ("No reason is
apparent why a public prosecutor's impartiality could not be impaired by institutional
interests, as by personal ones.").
245

Id. at 320.

246

Id.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 173-74 (1951).

247
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2. InstitutionalBias as Threat to ProsecutorialNeutrality
As described above, Massachusetts and many of the majority model
states institutionalize the use of a specific industry's funds for the
prosecution of a crime-insurance fraud-which specifically benefits the
financial interests of a specific group-insurance companies. Let us
consider a state which requires the assessed funds be kept in a distinct trust
account and that those funds be used exclusively to advance the purposes of
that state's insurance fraud prevention act. Could this arrangement alone be
sufficient to implicate the question of divided loyalties at issue in cases like
Young? In other words, could the structure of that arrangement be such that
the assessed party's interests conceivably could result in the prosecutors'
systemic identification with the funding industry to the point of potential
conflict?
Reasonably, that question seems to suggest an affirmative response.
As discussed earlier, at least one prosecutor has recognized that the Alliance
structure he labored under created a sufficient potential conflict of interest
such that he chose to recuse himself from prosecuting insurance companyretained medical professionals, and such that the Massachusetts IFB
routinely turned away investigating cases of insurer fraud based on
perceived potential conflicts. 248 Thus, the absence of a formal attorneyclient relationship already has not precluded self-identification of a conflict.
Hence, there should be little discomfort with addressing the existence of
that conflict systemically. Nor is this type of conflict best seen as extant in
only those cases adverse to insurance-funded interests. If such conflict is
recognized, it can only continue to exist in prosecutions favoring the
funding interest. As has been argued in the context of Virginia private
prosecutions, "[r]estricting the scope of participation of the private
prosecutor cannot alter the nature of the conflict ...because the private
[party's] interests remain a factor" in prosecutorial decision-making.24 9
Moreover, there is precedent for concluding that the influence of nonclient financial backers can corrupt criminal advocacy. Courts have
repeatedly recognized, in the criminal defense context, that "benefactor
payments" by third parties with an interest in the outcome of the proceeding
can create a practical conflict of loyalties.25 ° In particular, such payments
"may subject an attorney to undesirable outside influence and raise[] an

248

249

See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
Matthew S.Nichols, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Arguments Against Private

Prosecutors, 13 CAP. DEF. J.279, 294 (2001).
250 See, e.g., United States v.Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 932 (2d Cir. 1993) (describing a
traditional "house counsel" scenario where certain attorneys were retained on an ongoing
basis to represent members of the same alleged mafia crime family).
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ethical question
as to whether the attorney's loyalties are with the client or
' 25
the payor. 1
Courts in such circumstances have thus looked beyond the technical
nonexistence of an attorney-client relationship between the defense lawyer
and the third party to find a conflict of interest, and indeed occasionally
concluded that such a conflict is unwaivable.25 2 The same reasoning would
dictate that ongoing benefactor payments by insurance carriers to public
prosecutors create a similar de facto conflict, regardless of whether those
payments are sanctioned by the legislature. It is the impermissible conflict
of loyalties, not merely the fear of lost future earnings, which caused the
court to rule such arrangements impermissible in the defense context.
Mandatory as opposed to voluntary payments, therefore, should not be seen
to diminish the risk of impermissible prosecutor loyalty to the insurance
industry. The identification of even a systemic risk that a prosecutor would
view his funding industry as sufficiently "client-like" or otherwise
sufficiently influential so as to require his recusal-as occurred in
Massachusetts-supports recognition of at253least the existence of potential
conflicts of interest in the Alliance system.
The right to prosecutorial impartiality and Massachusetts Allianceinitiated prosecutions' potential infringement of that right were both at issue
in the Ellis prosecution.
Though the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts did not find the Alliance relationship impermissible, the
court did reiterate that the Massachusetts constitution guarantees an
impartial prosecutor, "in the sense that the prosecutor must not be nor
appear to be influenced ...either by his or her personal interests or by a
person or entity to whom the prosecution of a criminal case will or may
bring significant benefits. 2 54 The court held the Massachusetts scheme,
however, did not sufficiently influence prosecutorial decision-making so as
to be deemed improper. The court determined "the only obligation of the
division [was] to review each IFB report" and "[t]he statute le[ft] further
investigation
and any decision to prosecute exclusively in the division's
255
control.
251Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served upon John Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 248 n.6

(2d Cir. 1985) (en banc)).

252See id.; see also Aviva Abramovsky, The EnterpriseModel of Managing Conflicts of

Interest in the TripartiteInsuranceDefense Relationship, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 193 (2005).

253See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 US 279, 308 (1991) ("[S]tructural defects... defy

analysis by harmless error standards."); see also Wright v. United States, 732 F.2d 1048,
1056 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[T]he practical impossibility of establishing that the conflict has
worked to defendant's disadvantage dictates the adoption of standards under which a
reasonable potential for prejudice will suffice.").
254Commonwealth v. Ellis, 708 N.E.2d 644, 650 (Mass. 1999).
255 Id. at 652.
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The question of "control," however, somewhat misstates the nature of
the conflict implicated. As an ethical consideration it is not simply a
question of whether the interest implicated requires the prosecutor to act in
a specific way, but rather whether the nature of the relationship increases
the likelihood that, as a result of some other obligation or interest, the right
to a fair trial is implicated.2 56 The consequence of financing to create some
sense of obligation has been recognized by other courts when considering
disqualification of a prosecutor." 7
The court in Ellis emphasized the fact that the relationship between the
prosecution and the insurance industry had been legislatively mandated.
Specifically, the court stated:
If we were confronted with a challenge to an arrangement between insurers and the
Attorney General of the sort involved here that was not endorsed by statute, the
appearance of the possibility of improper influence would be far clearer. Although
statutory endorsement of an unconstitutional plan cannot make it constitutional, where
the question is whether the appearance of an arrangement may support a
determination of unconstitutionality, the fact that the Legislature has endorsed the
plan, has supervisory authority over it, and appropriates funds for it substantially
changes appearances.

Moreover, legislative mandate arguably should be insufficient in
isolation to remove the "appearance of impropriety" inherent to the Alliance
structure, particularly when it is the legislative creation of the relationship
which is the cause of the perception of impropriety. Simply, a legislative
mandate does not reduce the potential for prejudice to prosecutorial
neutrality, particularly if the prejudice is seen as arising naturally from the
structure of the relationship itself. In this respect, it is obvious that an
industry responsible, voluntarily or not, for an office's funding has more
than the mere appearance of influence. 259 The appearance of influence may
be reinforced by the enabling legislation, which requires the IFB and its
funded prosecutors to investigate and prosecute insurance fraud cases
referred largely by the insurance companies themselves. Further, the
appearance of influence is buttressed in Massachusetts by the legislative
assessments being placed on two associations of insurance companies
whose continued existence is determined solely by the member insurance
companies. It seems apparent that a prosecutor might try to curry favor
256

The concept of significant risk has always been central to the identification of a

conflict of interest. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2008) ("A concurrent
conflict of interest exists if... (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a
former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.") (emphasis added).
257 See People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 319-20 (Cal. 1996).
258 Ellis, 708 N.E.2d at 652 (emphasis added).
259 See MATA Brief, supra note 95, at 38.
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with the insurance industry out of fear that the industry would withdraw
funding by simply dissolving the organizations.260
If the industry
organizations ceased to exist, there could be no assessment and those
attorney general positions could foreseeably be terminated. Economic selfinterest is the greatest of motivators and a long-recognized source of
conflicting interests.
The Ellis court dismissed possible insurance industry dissolution of the
assessed organizations as speculative because the legislature could amend
the statute to mandatorily assess the insurance companies based on the
amount of business they transact. 26 1 This position is flawed in a variety of
respects. Principally, such a legislative response is itself merely speculative
and does little to cure any current problem of inappropriate influence.
Moreover, it ignores both the vagaries of the political system as well as the
lobbying power of the insurance industry, both of which make it unlikely
that the legislature would enact laws contravening the insurance industry's
perceived interests in the prosecution of insurance fraud. Furthermore, the
court's holding ignores the greater issue of the manner in which the
Alliance scheme permits insurance companies to be the initiators of
mandatory investigations, thereby abrogating a portion of executive
discretion. Insurance fraud department employees and the prosecutors who
work with them reasonably internalize this shift of initiating authority. As a
shift in interest also implicates the likelihood of influence on prosecutorial
neutrality, legislative mandate cannot salvage such a defect regardless of
the particular funding system legislatively imposed.
Ellis relied on yet another particularly dubious ground in validating the
Massachusetts scheme: the fact that the bureau and its related prosecutorial
office were funded by the insurance industry collectively rather than by
individual companies. The "dilution" of influence cited by the Ellis court is
largely fictitious, particularly in the insurance industry.
Although
individual insurance carriers have varying interests in particular fraud cases,
the industry is united in several material respects, including a general
262
benefit to be acquired from reduced claims and a chilled plaintiffs' bar.
Moreover, insurance companies, as a result of their unique regulatory
system, have great experience working together on industry-wide goals and
projects. Accordingly, even though the cost of the various assessments may
be distributed among many companies doing business in any given

260

See Rebecca A. Pinto, The Public Interest and Private Financing of Criminal

Prosecutions, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1343, 1367 n.130 (1999).
261 See Ellis, 708 N.E.2d at 651.
262 See Kennedy, supranote 8, at 622-23.
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jurisdiction, such "dilution" is insignificant when the goals of and benefits
to the industry from fraud prosecutions are so uniform.
Ellis therefore seems to interpret unreasonably the requirement of a
"disinterested prosecutor" as mandated by the Supreme Court in Young.
Although Young dealt with the narrower circumstance of the appointment
of special counsel in a criminal contempt proceeding, the same principles of
prosecutorial impartiality should preclude continuation of the
Massachusetts IFB program. Simply put, the indirect involvement of
insurance carriers through benefactor-type payments to criminal
investigators and offices of attorneys general creates a de facto conflict of
interest that damages prosecutorial impartiality.
Indeed, such a conflict can rationally be expected to occur in any
situation where the insulation of an investigator or prosecutor as true public
servants working with public funds is replaced by a scheme in the particular
interest of the funding party. As evidenced by the Massachusetts
prosecutors' own recusal, prosecutors can easily come to see their funding
industry in a quasi-client (or some other equally impermissible) fashion.2 63
Such a scenario unreasonably decreases the likelihood a defendant will
receive a neutral prosecutor.
Fundamental equality concerns are likewise implicated in the Alliance
system and left unaddressed by the Ellis court. Among its corrupting
features is that institutionalized entrance into the Alliance is restricted to
As Professor Joseph E. Kennedy warned,
insurance companies.
"preferential access to justice for monied interests.. . threatens the
defendant's distinct interest in equality. 264 Although he sardonically noted
that "no defendant has a right to a fiscally strapped prosecutor," he
emphasized that "the prospect of defendants facing disproportionate
prosecution by the government based on the wealth of their accusers is
troubling. 265 This conclusion was echoed by the Supreme Court of
California regarding the use of private third-party funds for investigative
purposes when it stated, "A system in which affluent victims, including
prosperous corporations, were assured of prompt attention from the district

263 See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
264
265

Kennedy, supra note 8, at 707.
Id. Nor should the ability of wealth to increase the negative treatment of those

already politically disempowered as a function of wealth be ignored. See id. ("The powers
wielded by government are considerable, as is the cost of merely being accused by the
government of criminal conduct. To the degree that the wealthy would enjoy a superior
ability to unleash these forces on those who offend their interests, inequalities of political
power that already exist as a function of wealth would be exacerbated.").
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attorney's office, while crimes against the poor went unprosecuted, would
neither deserve nor receive the confidence of the public. 2 66
B. SAFEGUARDING THE PLAINTIFFS' BAR: A NECESSARY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY
A persuasive argument can be made that the Alliance system creates a
substantive threat to any insurance fraud defendant's due process rights and
that such a problem is so systemic as to require its elimination. However,
since no court as of yet has found the Alliance system to be constitutionally
defective, its particular implications to the plaintiffs' bar may be
ameliorated in the interim by some lesser prophylactic administrative
remedy. As lawyers prosecuted for insurance fraud are charged as a result
of actions undertaken in their capacity as lawyers, the "buffer" proposal,
discussed in the next section, contends that their behavior most
appropriately should first be reviewed by the agencies charged with
determining the correctness of attorney conduct as a question of
professional responsibility.
It may legitimately be asked why the prosecution of an attorney for
insurance fraud should require such regulatory review as part of a criminal
proceeding. The regulation of the legal profession has frequently been
deemed not only a legitimate government interest, but a compelling one. 67
As such, despite possible equal protection concerns, a legislative scheme
that treats attorneys differently from other criminal defendants can be
justified if a rational basis exists for providing them with added
protection. 268
266
267

268

See People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 318 (Cal. 1996).
See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar Assn., 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).
The Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution ensures that "all persons similarly

situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
439 (1985). When state action implicates a fundamental right or involves a suspect
classification, such as race, a classification will "receive the strictest scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause." Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 293 (2004). However, where
state action does not concern a suspect classification or a fundamental right, even
intentionally unequal treatment will be upheld unless "there is no rational basis for the
difference in treatment." Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), the Supreme Court addressed the question of how
rational basis review is to be applied to similarly situated persons:
The initial discretion to determine what is "different" and what is "the same" resides in the
legislatures of the states. A legislature must have substantial latitude to establish classifications
that roughly approximate the nature of the problem perceived, that accommodate competing
concerns both public and private, and that account for limitations on the practical ability of the
state to remedy every ill. In applying the equal protection clause to most forms of state action,
we thus seek only the assurance that the classification at issue bears some fair relationship to a
legitimate public purpose.
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The New Hampshire Supreme Court's discussion in In re Grimme of
the public's ongoing interest in the protection of lawyers from, among other
things, frivolous or retaliatory litigation is particularly relevant to our
discussion.269 That court upheld a statute allowing licensed psychologists to
be subject to a lesser standard of proof than attorneys in license revocation
proceedings. The court held that applying a preponderance of the evidence
standard for psychologists, as opposed to the stricter clear and convincing
evidence standard the state used in attorney proceedings, was not a
violation of psychologists' right to equal protection, despite the added
protection it afforded attorneys. The court stated that "the State is free to
treat professions differently according to the needs of the public in relation
to each," and reasoned that there existed a reasonable basis for the
distinction based on the inherent differences in the nature of the two
professions.27 °

Id. at 216.
Similar principles have been used to justify differential treatment of various professions
under the criminal law in order to safeguard legitimate regulatory or societal interests. In
Davila v. Yates, No. C05-4614SI, 2006 WL 1867635 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 5, 2006), the defendant,
a contractor, asserted that a California criminal statute violated his right to equal protection
under the law since it punished contracting without a license as a felony, while similar
criminal statutes penalized other licensing crimes as misdemeanors. Applying rational basis
review, the court held it was "left with no other choice than to conclude that the
classification of fraudulent use of a contractor's license as a felony is rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose." Id. at *25. Other statutes that differentiate on the basis of
professional classification have similarly been upheld under the rational basis review
standard. See, e.g., Pushkin v. Califano, 600 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Bussey v.
Harris, 611 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1980) (denial of Medicare reimbursement to physician
assistants found rational). Moreover, a regulation allowing different treatment of architects
and engineers (as opposed to other persons) to streamline the building permit process was
found to have a rational basis. Levine v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 3119, 2002 WL
5588 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2002). In Georgia, a statute setting forth attorney fee arbitration rules
were found to be constitutional. Nodvin v. State Bar of Ga., 544 S.E.2d 142 (Ga. 2001).
That court ruled that attorneys were not a suspect class and requiring attorneys to justify
their fees in front of an arbitration panel was rationally related to the legitimate goal of
maintaining confidence in the legal system. Id. at 560.
269 635 A.2d 461 (N.H. 1993).
270 Particularly, the court noted that the legal profession is distinct in that attorneys are
involved in an adversarial process and a higher standard of proof may discourage frivolous
claims by disgruntled losing parties. As an adversarial relationship is uncharacteristic in the
psychological profession, the court found a higher standard was not necessary in
psychologist disciplinary proceedings. Moreover, the court reasoned that the nature of an
attorney's work is more public than the work of a psychologist since it creates an inevitable
paper trail. In psychology, sessions are held in private without the presence of third party
witnesses. Consequently, misconduct on the part of a psychologist is more difficult to prove.
Because of these inherent differences in the nature of the professions, the court determined
that the lower burden of proof survived rational basis review and did not violate equal
protection. Id. at 462.
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Given that a vigorous plaintiffs' bar is necessary to the integrity of the
tort justice system, there is clearly a legitimate societal interest in offering
protection to attorneys against unfounded or premature criminal charges.
Even medical professionals are not subject to the same degree of disruption
should they come under criminal investigation in the course of their
practice. Doctors can continue to treat their patients if their files are
subpoenaed, but the files of law firms are at the very heart of the
representation process and any premature compromise of such records'
confidentiality can severely damage the attorney-client relationship. It can
thus be argued that the unique effect of insurance fraud charges on the legal
profession merits a greater degree of procedural protection for accused
lawyers than for others indicted for similar crimes. The disruption that such
charges cause to the plaintiffs' bar, and to the clients themselves, is
different in both degree and kind from the effect on other professional
relationships. For this reason, a variety of legislative approaches are
possible. However, in the interim, the next Part suggests a procedural
judicial response.
C. AN ADMINISTRATIVE BUFFER: BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF
CRIME PREVENTION AND EFFECTIVE CIVIL JUSTICE
The judiciary, to its credit, has been aware of the problematic aspects
of the Alliance, and has in some instances been willing to mitigate attorney
harm resulting from insurance fraud investigations. 27' For instance, the
California courts have offered protections relating to attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine when attorneys' files are seized
pursuant to a search warrant issued as part of a criminal investigation of
alleged insurance fraud. 72 In People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
(Lafi, 27 3 the Supreme Court of California upheld the right of attorneys who
were under investigation for automobile insurance fraud to have a special
master, appointed by the trial court, determine which of the seized
documents were subject to either attorney-client privilege or the work
product doctrine.2 74 The court held that, even though the matter had not
271

People v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles, 23 P.3d 563 (2001) (authorizing appointment of

a special master to review seized documents to determine privilege).
272

Id. at 735-37.

273

Id.
In a subsequent case, People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Weitzman, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d

274

165 (Ct. App. 2003), a qui tam civil action eventually lost by Allstate in order to recover
funds on behalf of the state allegedly defrauded by the Laff scheme, the court included a
letter to a Los Angeles newspaper describing the aggressive nature of the search:
An October 9, 1996, letter published in the Los Angeles Daily Journal responded to the October
1 article. It described the execution of the search warrant at Mr. Laff's office as follows:
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been referred to a criminal court proceeding at the time, both mandates of
the privilege and its inherent authority authorized the trial court's use of the
special master.27 5
Remedies such as those created by the Laff court, however, are at best
incomplete. Although the court was willing to appoint a special master for
determinations of privilege, the evaluation of attorney professional conduct
as part of the fraud is generally left to the trial mechanism alone.276 To the
extent that attorneys may limit their actions as a result of their perceptions
of potential conflicts or other perceptions of influence, a more
comprehensive safeguard is justified to protect the crucial role of the
plaintiffs' bar in insurance fraud litigation.2 77
Obviously, the most comprehensive remedy against the dangers of the
Alliance would be to strike down all private insurance industry financing of
criminal investigations and prosecutions, and remove the special status
granted the insurance industry in triggering investigations as part of the
current Alliance system. This, however, would require either legislative
reform or judicial interpretation opposite of that announced in Ellis. It is
unrealistic to conclude that either of these eventualities will occur in the
near future.
One potential remedy for the Alliance's distortion of the criminal
justice system was, ironically, suggested by the prosecution in the Marks
case. 278 In that case, Marks's counsel had argued to the Florida Supreme
Court that the statute under which the law firm was being prosecuted
"Approximately 30 flak-jacketed 'officers,' with guns drawn, came running down office
hallways and barged into Mr. Laffs offices to serve the search warrant. What Mr. Kass
[Financial's attorney] was overseeing was, in effect, 'discovery' by Gestapo tactics. [ ] I hav[e]
nothing to do with Mr. Laff or any of the issues or subject matter of the underlying case.
However, it may well be prophetic for all in society when, as one of the officers was leaving at
the end of the day, he said to me in the hall as the elevator door closed, 'We're coming for you
next."'

Id. at 170 (citing Letters to the Editor, "Gestapo Tactics" Used in Law Office Search, L.A.
DAILY J., Oct. 9, 1996, at 7).

Super. Ct. of Los Angeles, 25 Cal. 4th at 735-37. This reflects Supreme Court
jurisprudence regarding the importance of the attorney-client privilege. See United States v.
Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 568-75 (1989) (holding that before documents claimed to be covered by
this privilege may be subjected to an in camera review by the judge to ascertain if the crimefraud exception may be validly invoked, the state must make an evidentiary showing
plausibly implicating the possible application of the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client
privilege).
276 See United States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299 (5th Cir. 1994).
277 The use of procedural reforms in the prosecution of lawyers is one manner by which
"possible prosecutorial misuse of the criminal law" and the "criminalizing [of] socially
desirable and professionally accepted lawyer conduct" may be guarded against. See
Wolfram, supra note 15, at 76.
278 Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 191, at 10.
275
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violated the equal protection clauses of the United States and Florida
constitutions since it penalized nondisclosures by attorneys and insurance
claimants but not by insurance carriers.279 In response, the prosecutor
argued that, although prevention of fraud and bad faith by insurance
companies was as worthy a goal as preventing fraud by claimants, the
insurance carriers could be effectively regulated via civil and administrative
means.2 80 The Marks firm's response was that the distinction drawn by the
prosecution was specious, since attorneys were also subject to a similar
regulatory system. 281
The Florida Supreme Court did not resolve this equal protection issue,
since it decided in favor of the Marks firm on vagueness grounds.2 82 The
interplay of the prosecution and defense briefs, however, suggests a method
by which a buffer may be placed between the insurance industry and
financially motivated prosecutions of plaintiffs' attorneys. Attorneys are
officers of the court and are subject to discipline by the judicial system and
its designees. 283 Moreover, as the Marks prosecution argued, administrative
regulation by expert bodies can be an effective method of policing an

279 Cross-Reply Brief of Marvin Marks, supra note 172, at 7.
280 Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 191, at 10 ("[C]laimants and insurance
companies occupy substantially different legal positions. Insurance companies are heavily
regulated by the State. Unfair trade practices and unfair settlement practices are prohibited.
Fraudulent acts by insurers could result in the loss of licenses to conduct business in the
State. If insurers fail to settle a legitimate claim, they can be held liable for excess verdicts
for bad faith. Claimants and their attorneys are not subject to these regulations.").
281 Cross-Reply Brief of Marvin Marks, supra note 172, at 9 ("The State also argues that
the insurance fraud statute need not apply equally to insurance companies because insurance
companies are regulated by the State .... The conduct of attorneys, physicians and
operators of hospitals are similarly regulated by appropriate licensing authorities and they all
bear the same risk of losing their licenses. In fact, the [Florida] insurance fraud statute itself
provides that in addition to criminal penalties... [a]ttorneys who commit fraud
are.. . subject to disciplinary proceedings and risk the loss of their license to practice law,
under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Thus, the State's urged distinction is
nonexistent.").
282 See State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So. 2d 533, 538 (Fla. 1997).
283 See People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 490-92 (N.Y. 1928) (expressing the
role of attorneys as officers of the court and reiterating the long tradition of attorney
discipline as the proper province of the judiciary). In that decision, Benjamin Cardozo
reviews the regulatory authority of courts in the disciplining of lawyers within the common
law system from the Middle Ages in Britain to the modern era in New York. Id. at 490-92.
For an excellent analysis of attorney discipline systems, see Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., The
Revised Lawyer Discipline Process in Arkansas: A Primerand Analysis, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REv. 13 (1998); Jennifer M. Kraus, Attorney Discipline Systems: Improving Public
Perception and Increasing Efficacy, 84 MARQ. L. REv. 273 (2000); Leslie C. Levin, The
Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2007); Fred C.
Zacharias, The Purposesof Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 675 (2003).
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Consequently, just as the Marks prosecutor urged that
state regulatory agencies are useful in determining alleged malfeasance by
insurance carriers, the attorney disciplinary board of each state could be an
option for initial review of allegations that the professional conduct of
lawyers constituted insurance fraud.
The proposed "buffer" system would involve offering the appropriate
disciplinary agency the opportunity to first review the lawyer's conduct as a
regulatory matter.285 Though this system would be best effectuated by
legislation, the courts could potentially use their inherent authority 286 to
seek guidance from these disciplinary committees as a sort of special master
to assist in their inquiries. Since attorneys' conduct is regulated by an
existing, comprehensive professional disciplinary scheme generally
constituted under the judiciary's supervisory powers, the criminal courts
could incorporate these disciplinary boards as a source of initial inquiry
when vetting allegations of insurance fraud.
In effect, the court would stay the criminal proceedings at a very early
stage and refer the case to the appropriate disciplinary agency which would
effectively play the role of a special master in determining whether there
were sufficient indicia of fraudulent conduct to warrant criminal
penalties.2 87 Where allegedly fraudulent conduct committed by attorneys
implicates common litigation practices of the plaintiffs' bar, as in Marks,
industry's ethics.

284 See Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 191, at 10.
285 This

could be accomplished under a procedure analogous to abstention in federal

courts. See generally Lewis Yelin, Burford Abstention in FederalActions for Damages, 99
COLUM. L. REv. 1871 (1999) (providing an overview of the abstention doctrine). While most
federal abstention doctrines are grounded in comity between federal and state governments,
others are based on prudential considerations such as efficient administration of justice and
avoidance of unnecessary constitutional litigation. See id. Among the grounds upon which
federal courts may utilize their discretion to abstain is where exercise of jurisdiction might
impair state regulatory systems. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). "Burford
abstention" is appropriate where
the particular regulatory scheme involves a matter of substantial public concern[,] ... is "the sort
of complex, technical regulatory scheme to which the Burford abstention doctrine usually is
applied," and [where] review of a party's claims would interfere with the state's efforts to
establish and maintain a coherent regulatory policy.
Chiropractic Am. v. LaVecchia, 180 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 1999).
286 A court has the "inherent power to control and prevent the abuse of its process." See
People v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles, 23 P.3d 563, 570 (2001). This authority "extends to
appointing special masters to perform subordinate judicial duties." Id. at 585.
287 Although special masters are usually used in the civil context, they are also used in
criminal cases for such purposes as determining whether materials seized from attorneys'
offices are privileged. FED. R. Civ. P. 53; Super. Ct. of Los Angeles, 23 P.3d at 586.
Moreover, it has long been held that a court may instigate an inquiry as part of any "quasiadministrative remedy whereby the court is given information that may move it to other acts
thereafter." Culkin, 162 N.E. at 492.
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considerations similar to those at stake in other regulatory offenses militate

in favor of preliminary vetting by disciplinary tribunals.288
Attorney disciplinary systems, rather than prosecutors in alliance with
insurance companies, are better suited to determine the line between lawyer
fraud and aggressive, though ethical, legal tactics. 289 Disciplinary boards
have extensive experience resolving disputes in this area. 290 Disciplinary

committees, whether appointed by a court or by a state bar association, are
composed primarily of attorneys and encounter questions of unethical
conduct on a daily basis.2 9'
In addition, they employ specialized
investigative staff who are conversant with ethical matters. 292
The

288

That in some jurisdictions violations of attorney discipline rules are prohibited as

grounds for another cause of action in tort does not preclude this buffer system. Generally,
such rules simply reflect the idea that ethical violations do not create private causes of
actions in the clients or third parties. See Criton A. Constantinides, Note, Professional
Ethics Codes in Court: Redefining the Social Contract Between the Public and the
Professions, 25 GA. L. REV. 1327, 1356 (1991). There is no prohibition that the judiciary
may not use information or decisions acquired from its own inquiries to assist it in other
determinations.
289 The evaluation of the professional conduct of lawyers has long been considered
the
proper domain of the courts and their various delegates. See Culkin, 162 N.E. at 493 ("If the
house is to be cleaned, it is for those who occupy and govern it, rather than for strangers, to
do the noisome work.")
290 See Levin, supra note 283, at 1 (stating that "[e]ach year state disciplinary agencies
receive more than 125,000 lawyer discipline complaints against the 1.3 million lawyers in
the United States").
291 See Zacharias, supra note 283, at 690 (noting that the actors implementing the
disciplinary process-the rulemakers, the prosecutors, and the reviewing judges-are
ordinarily are all lawyers). Lay participation in attorney discipline is, however, on the rise.
Id. at n.54.
292 See Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor'sClothes and Other Tales About the Standardsfor
Imposing Lawyer Discipline Standards, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) (noting that "[m]ost
state discipline agencies have full-time professional disciplinary counsel and investigators").
The most recent ABA comprehensive report on the state of disciplinary committees is
known as the McKay Commission Report. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMISSION
ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1992). The McKay Commission Report

found that "almost without exception, disciplinary systems [were now] staffed by full-time
professional disciplinary counsel having statewide jurisdiction." Id.
The New York attorney discipline system, for instance, is typical of states that do not
delegate disciplinary matters to bar associations. In New York, each of the four departments
of the Appellate Division maintains a disciplinary committee that acts as an arm of the court.
Each committee has a full-time staff of attorneys, investigators, and clerical personnel who
receive complaints, "make an initial judgment whether a sufficient basis exists on whether to
proceed with an investigation," and determine upon full investigation whether to commence
formal or informal disciplinary proceedings. New York State Bar Association Legal
Handbook, ch. 21,
Attorney Discipline (2005), available at http://www.
nysba.org/Content/NevigationMenu/PublicResources/UnhappywithaNYAttorney/Unhappywith aNYAt.htm. Pursuant to Section 90 of the New York State Judiciary Law, formal
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committees are intimately familiar with both the relevant disciplinary rules
and the customs and practices of the legal profession.293 Hence, they are
uniquely suited to distinguish acceptable professional practice from
fraudulent conduct.
This is critical because courts have repeatedly recognized that the
ethical obligations of attorneys accused of criminal conduct are key to
determining whether they in fact acted with a criminal mental state.294
Accordingly, courts have held that attorneys accused of insurance fraud are
entitled to present evidence concerning the rules of professional ethics to
support their claims that they acted in good faith and thereby lacked the
necessary mental state to be guilty of an offense.295
In a criminal court, where the jury is typically unfamiliar with legal
ethics, expert testimony is used to prove adherence to the relevant
professional rules. In United States v. Kelly, 296 for instance, the Eleventh
Circuit held that it was error to preclude an attorney charged with
participating in a narcotics conspiracy from presenting expert proof
regarding "his professional obligations as an attorney., 297 Specifically, the
court held that the rules governing protection of client confidentiality as
well as the duty of an attorney to counsel his clients against committing
further crimes were relevant to the attorney's state of mind in conducting
certain conversations in which he advised his clients not to consummate
drug deals.2 98 He was, therefore, entitled to present proof on these issues as
a "basis for his primary defense: that he acted not with criminal intent but
within the legitimate bounds of legal representation. 2 99

disciplinary proceedings are heard by one or more referees and are subject to review by the
Appellate Division.
293 The determinations of a disciplinary board are generally considered sufficiently
expert that state courts will typically rely on the findings of the hearing panel when
considering the disciplinary board's recommendation of sanctions. See Levin, supra note
292, at 19.
294 See United States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299, 1308-10 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that where
"a lawyer's responsibility to the client collides with other rules of law," a complex "interplay
of conflicting duties" is created, and there are often conflicting opinions about how the
attorney should proceed). Thus, where professional standards "guide [the] conduct" of a
lawyer who is accused of committing fraud in collusion with a client, "they are directly
relevant to his intent." Id.
295 Id. at 1309; see also United States v. Kellington, 217 F.3d 1084, 1099-1100 (9th Cir.
2000); United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 743-44 (1 1th Cir. 1989).
296 888 F.2d at 732.
297 Id. at 743.
298 See id.
299

Id.
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This principle was developed to an even greater extent in United States
v. Cavin,30 0 which involved questions of tax and insurance fraud. 30 ' As in
Kelly, the court held that the exclusion of expert proof concerning the
defendant attorneys' ethical obligations was reversible error.30 2 It went
further by noting that "[e]xpert testimony may be particularly appropriate
when specialized areas of law, such as the insurance and financial matters
relevant herein, are at issue. 30 3 Likewise, in United States v. Kellington,3 °4
where an attorney was accused of obstructing justice by helping his client
destroy certain documents, the court held he had a duty of loyalty to the
client as long as he "[did] not affirmatively know his client's objectives to
be illegal., 30 5 Given Kellington's defense was based on his ethical
obligations, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury that the testimony of his expert on legal ethics was
"merely background information. 30 6
In practice, the principles outlined in cases such as Cavin and
Kellington can lead both to procedural and substantive confusion. Needless
to say, the defendant's ethical expert will be opposed by a prosecution
expert who will present a competing view of the relevant ethical
obligations.30 7
Since courts in many jurisdictions are wary of expert
testimony that might pertain to the ultimate issue before the jury, the use of
expert testimony in nearly all American jurisdictions is typically subject to
a threshold showing of acceptance or reliability.30 8 This can lead to a
3O 39 F.3d 1299 (5th Cir. 1994).
301

Id. at 1302-04.

Id. at 1309.
Id. The court also noted that the relevant state disciplinary rules and American Bar
Association opinions were in conflict regarding attorneys' obligations to disclose financial
302
303

frauds by their clients, and thus expert testimony could help guide the trier of fact through

the process of determining the defendants' mental state. Id. The court noted, for instance,
that attorneys are required to disclose material facts "when disclosure is necessary to avoid
assisting in a criminal or fraudulent act by a client," but that an exception to this rule
occurred where "disclosure is prohibited by the rule against revealing client confidences."
Given "most such disclosures would consist of client confidences" and the parameters of the
relevant ethical rules depend in part on the lawyer's role in the reporting process, the
defendants are entitled to present evidence of how the interplay of the ethical and legal
obligations influenced their behavior. See id.
304217 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000).
305 Id. at 1099.
306 Id.

307 See id. at 743 (discussing cases in which the prosecution had introduced expert
testimony on professional ethics as proof of guilt); see also State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487,
492 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
permitting the prosecutor to present expert testimony on professional ethics).
308A majority of American jurisdictions, including the federal courts, now follow the
multifactor test established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and
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remarkable amount of preliminary litigation30in9 recognition of the effect that
legal ethics could have on the potential jury.
Even in bench trials and pretrial proceedings before a judge, such
expert testimony has proven troublesome. For instance, in Marks the trial
court heard expert testimony and the appellate courts accepted amicus
curiae arguments concerning the ethical standards to which attorneys are
held during pre-suit negotiations. 310 The issue of proper negotiating
behavior was hotly contested during the pretrial proceedings, with the
Florida Trial Lawyers' Association contending that in pretrial negotiations
"puffing was the norm, '3 11 and the State Attorney's office arguing that
failure to exercise complete candor was unethical and fraudulent. 1 2 The
state courts wrestled with this issue to an uncertain conclusion, determining
that the line between zealous advocacy and fraud was not easy to draw but
declining to enumerate the particular types of conduct that might fall on
either side of that line.313
An attorney disciplinary committee would be familiar with the relevant
ethical rules, precedents, and opinions, not only in its own state, but also in
other American jurisdictions. As with other specialized tribunals such as
workers' compensation boards, civil service boards, or zoning boards of
appeal, lawyer grievance committees are experts in the area of law they
administer. 31 4 They would not require guidance from potentially partisan
outside experts to determine the dividing line between legitimate advocacy
and insurance fraud, and they would have the expertise and resources to
determine what attorneys may or may not do.
The need for a disciplinary buffer is strongest where, as in Marks and
similar cases, the alleged fraudulent conduct consists of overzealous
advocacy or withholding of information rather than fabricated claims.
Advocacy-based charges implicate lawyering practices and are thus targeted

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). A minority of states still follow the
Frye standard, which requires that expert opinion be generally accepted within the relevant
professional field. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Both standards,
however, require the party proffering the testimony to make a threshold showing.
309 See United States v. Naegele, 471 F. Supp. 2d 152, 157 (D.D.C. 2007) (both sides
proffered the testimony of legal ethics experts, which led to extensive preliminary litigation
concerning whether their testimony was sufficiently reliable to admit and whether testimony
on certain topics should be precluded as invading the province of the jury).
310 See State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So. 2d 533, 537-38 (Fla. 1997).
311 Id. at 8.
312 See Brief of Petitioner on the Merits at 5, No. 85,920, 1995 WL 17016003 (Fla. Jul.
20, 1995).
313See State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 758 So. 2d 1131, 1137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
314See Zacharias, supra note 283, at 690 (noting the expertise of disciplinary boards and
recognizing that ethical evaluators are usually attorneys).
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at the very activities the Alliance improperly seeks to chill, while classic
frauds such as staged accidents do not. For prudential reasons, however, it
would be advisable to extend the buffer system to all insurance fraud
charges against attorneys, no matter what the underlying alleged conduct,
when the charges implicate any in-role conduct. If only certain alleged
attorney-fraud cases were subject to a buffer, then there would be a risk of
endless preliminary litigation over whether or not the buffer system applied
to a particular case or whether it applied to all counts against a specific
defendant. This would prolong rather than expedite the legal proceedings
against the attorney, which is itself one of the harms caused by Allianceinspired criminal charges, 315 and thus would defeat one of the central
purposes of the proposed buffer.
There are other and more generalized reasons why disciplinary bodies
should be permitted to vet insurance fraud charges against lawyers. One
such reason is that disciplinary tribunals are quasi-judicial rather than
prosecutorial organs, and thus have no financial or political connection to
the insurance industry.
As has been discussed above, prosecutorial
agencies are subject to influence by the insurance industry, and even when
not directly funded by the industry, are often prone to adopt the industry's
positions on contentious issues. The very essence of the Alliance is that,
along with preferential legislatively granted access and authority, the
insurance industry's attitudes and opinions permeate the investigative and
prosecutorial branches of the criminal justice system, and police and
prosecutors are tainted with at least the appearance, and often the actuality,
of advocating for the economic interests of insurance carriers.
An attorney grievance committee, in contrast, is a body infused with
impartiality. Instead of using the criminal justice system as a heavy-handed
method 316 of policing litigation tactics, a disciplinary committee would
focus on the real issue: whether the attorney's conduct, in light of relevant
statutes and ethical rules, constituted proper practice.
A grievance
committee is uniquely suited to take an impartial first look at insurance
companies' allegations against lawyers, investigate such allegations without
the appearance or reality of financial influence, and serve as expert advisor

315 See supra notes 190-219 and accompanying text.
316 The regulation of lawyers by criminal prosecution, in the absence of the opportunity
to be handled administratively, significantly shifts the power of such regulation from the
judiciary, ever cognizant of the lawyer's role within the legal process, to the legislature's
more democratic but potentially more reactionary domain. See Zacharias, supra note 283, at
726 ("[M]any situations addressed by the professional rules demand flexibility in regulation
that is not possible under a criminal law model.... [B]y leaving the regulation of the legal
system in the hands of politicians, society would risk dramatic changes in professional rules
geared to what is popular rather than what is systemically justified.").
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to the courts as it considers dismissal of some or all charges based on the
lawyers' professional conduct.
In addition, in the majority of jurisdictions, attorney disciplinary
complaints are private and the information revealed therein is made public
only after a finding of probable cause.317 A minority of jurisdictions holds
even the hearings private from the public.3t 8 Thus, if suspected cases of
insurance fraud are initially handled within the disciplinary system or by a
process analogous to it, confidentiality could be used to preclude the type of
high-profile press releases commonly associated with criminal charges
against lawyers. Even if the rules of adjudication do not currently hold the
investigations private, the use of the disciplinary agent for this "special
master" purpose could be done in camera with the transcriptions sealed.319
The investigation will be conducted in a private and dignified manner with
respect for the rights of all parties rather than being made the subject of
damaging media exposure before the charges are levied. In any event, even
if confidentiality were not maintained, the opportunity for expert evaluation
of professional conduct alone is useful.
Moreover, many of the ancillary charges that accompany insurance
fraud prosecutions are fundamentally ethical or administrative in nature.
Allegations related to record-keeping or illicit solicitation of clients are
primarily concerned with the public image of the legal profession and the
administration of the courts.32 ° Consequently, they are more appropriately
weighed by the very agencies charged with policing professional ethics. In
the American legal system, this is traditionally the role of disciplinary
committees, whether operated as an arm of the courts or by state bar
associations under legislative authority.

317

The fact that these proceedings are not public does not mean they are not available to

the court. Since disciplinary proceedings are usually seen as a procedure by the court, then
any ruling they make, would be available to the court.
318 See Levin, supra note 283, at 1 (noting that "in many jurisdictions, discipline
complaints, discipline files, and even many discipline sanctions are private"). The level of
privacy varies state to state, with Florida, New Hampshire, Oregon, and West Virginia
keeping all or most professional complaints as a part of the public record. Id. at 19. In the
majority of jurisdictions, the complaint only becomes public record once there has been a
finding of probable cause. Id. A minority ofjurisdictions prohibit the public from attending
the disciplinary hearings, even after a finding of probable cause, with information about
complaints only made public once there has been a finding of wrongdoing and the
imposition of a public sanction. Id. at 19-20.
319 Hearings may be held in camera so as not to prejudice a criminal defendant or in the
interest of attomey-client confidentiality. In California, for example, courts hold the hearing
on replacement of counsel in camera with the resulting transcripts sealed. See CAL. RULE OF
CT. 33.5; People v. Mardsen, 465 P.2d 44 (1970).
320 See People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 490-92 (N.Y. 1928).
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It should be noted that, in the event evidence actually does
demonstrate fraud, the legitimate rights of prosecutors and insurance
carriers will be safeguarded. In fraud cases, disciplinary authorities will
lose little time in making findings against the accused attorneys, and any
statute of limitations concerns can be addressed by tolling the applicable
statute for the duration of the disciplinary process. Indeed, where a
disciplinary board has issued a finding of unethical practice, prosecutors
will likely face far less difficulty in obtaining guilty pleas or restitution
from the attorneys at issue.
V. CONCLUSION
The assessment of private funds on the insurance industry to assist in
the prosecution of crimes primarily affecting that industry's interests
requires that the potential of conflicting interests arising under such a
system be addressed. Such a system increases the risk that lawyers
representing interests adverse to the funding industry will come within the
purview of those funded prosecutorial agencies to their perceived, and
perhaps actual, detriment. To alleviate fears of "targeting," inappropriate
influence, and special access, some form of prophylactic measure is
appropriate.
The regulation of lawyers as lawyers has long been the traditional
domain of ethics regulators. By requiring the initial judgment of litigation
techniques to be assessed by these bodies, or some similar expert hearing
officer, the risk of chilled advocacy is reduced, if not eliminated. While
lawyers are not, and should not be, immune from criminal prosecution, the
nature of their role as advocate should also not be discounted. In the
absence of such measures, the regulation of lawyers will increasingly
become the domain of the criminal law and lawyers' tactical judgments
subject to the scrutiny of the prosecution. Even in the absence of a biased
prosecutor, such shift in governance is possibly unwise. Given the
existence of risks to prosecutorial neutrality in the insurance fraud context,
such a result is most definitely unsound.
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